The P = ¬P nature of a Moorean sentence seems clear, but (as an aside) it does reflect a binary approach to thought that not all agree is always correct. Those who deny the excluded middle would have no problem with it logically, nor would some Eastern modes of thought.
As a further aside, in the phrase, "It's raining; I don't believe it's raining," the second clause could be taken as an assertion of disbelief at the fact that it is actually raining (perhaps because the forecast promised a clear day or because the rain ruined some event). 😁
Thank you for commenting. Per your example, your account relies on a possible interpretation as it *could be taken as an assertion*. But that is pragmatics, for those words could mean *anything*. You import a certain subjective statement to clear up the contradiction. But any interpretation could work so long as it makes the statement makes sense. What I deal with is semantics, the abstract meaning of the words.
Certainly. I think that semantics goes beyond word meanings, though, it applies to what sentences carry in combining words. The same words rearranged or emphasized differently can carry different semantics. For example, "I can't *BELIEVE* it's raining" makes the semantics pretty clear. I think what you call pragmatics is what I see as part of semantics.
Ultimately, I think we just put different labels on things. I'm agreeing with your overall points here so far.
bro... you ask for criticism while writing stuff like
"Of course, our beliefs aren’t directed at the world but at thoughts or “propositions,” those non-spatial, non-causal, non-temporal entities whose existence is self-evident, as I’ve discussed here."
of course?? nothing here is 'self-evident' to me. certain (meta)philosophical disagreements can't be remedied via criticism, eg. when someone asserts something unintelligible to be self-evident. this is cult-level communication, just a bunch of thought-terminating magic. in fact, to me and many others, it's best described as unintelligible gibberish slop that 'thoughts' (something 'we' have, but are separate) are non-spatial, non-causal, non-temporal entities.
famously, all that these kinds of views have going for them is a bunch of academic philosophers asserting that these are unanalyzable, simple, irreducible, self-evident... this is just an impasse. building out some goofy system based on such magical assertions is a closed loop onanism.
Beliefs are directed at thoughts/concepts/ideas/propositions (I'm indifferent for what you call them), but let me know where you disagree. Feel free to check out the SEP on "concepts" to understand what I'm referring to first: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/
The P = ¬P nature of a Moorean sentence seems clear, but (as an aside) it does reflect a binary approach to thought that not all agree is always correct. Those who deny the excluded middle would have no problem with it logically, nor would some Eastern modes of thought.
As a further aside, in the phrase, "It's raining; I don't believe it's raining," the second clause could be taken as an assertion of disbelief at the fact that it is actually raining (perhaps because the forecast promised a clear day or because the rain ruined some event). 😁
Thank you for commenting. Per your example, your account relies on a possible interpretation as it *could be taken as an assertion*. But that is pragmatics, for those words could mean *anything*. You import a certain subjective statement to clear up the contradiction. But any interpretation could work so long as it makes the statement makes sense. What I deal with is semantics, the abstract meaning of the words.
I go into more detail on this criticism in part 2 here https://neonomos.substack.com/p/what-is-a-belief-part-2-language
Certainly. I think that semantics goes beyond word meanings, though, it applies to what sentences carry in combining words. The same words rearranged or emphasized differently can carry different semantics. For example, "I can't *BELIEVE* it's raining" makes the semantics pretty clear. I think what you call pragmatics is what I see as part of semantics.
Ultimately, I think we just put different labels on things. I'm agreeing with your overall points here so far.
bro... you ask for criticism while writing stuff like
"Of course, our beliefs aren’t directed at the world but at thoughts or “propositions,” those non-spatial, non-causal, non-temporal entities whose existence is self-evident, as I’ve discussed here."
of course?? nothing here is 'self-evident' to me. certain (meta)philosophical disagreements can't be remedied via criticism, eg. when someone asserts something unintelligible to be self-evident. this is cult-level communication, just a bunch of thought-terminating magic. in fact, to me and many others, it's best described as unintelligible gibberish slop that 'thoughts' (something 'we' have, but are separate) are non-spatial, non-causal, non-temporal entities.
famously, all that these kinds of views have going for them is a bunch of academic philosophers asserting that these are unanalyzable, simple, irreducible, self-evident... this is just an impasse. building out some goofy system based on such magical assertions is a closed loop onanism.
stop. get some help.
Beliefs are directed at thoughts/concepts/ideas/propositions (I'm indifferent for what you call them), but let me know where you disagree. Feel free to check out the SEP on "concepts" to understand what I'm referring to first: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/
are 'thinker' and 'thought/concept/idea/proposition' ontically separate existents?
Yes
What are your disagreements? Happy to answer questions.
I tried.