Correct me if I’m wrong, but this is meant to be an internal critique, so my understanding is that you’re making the critique from within the omni-theist’s own framework to show an internal contradiction. I just wanted to say that I know written comments can sometimes come across as more intense or hostile than intended, so I hope it’s clear that I’m just sharing my perspective in good faith (pun intended).
When you say God has a nature He cannot change, at least under classical theism, change requires potentiality because it involves a transition from one state to another, and potentiality implies imperfection since it indicates dependence, incompleteness or unfulfilled capacity. So that’s why what you describe as a flaw (God’s immutability) is actually an essential feature of His perfect, independent and complete nature.
God’s immutability doesn’t entail that He’s restricted by logic, as I'll try to explain. Logic is just the reflection in the created order of God’s rational nature, including His logical mind. It’s not that the principles of logic restrain God, but that what it means to be perfect is to never have the ability to be imperfect. Acting illogically or irrationally would be imperfect. Nor is it the case that something’s logical or rational merely because God does it, or that God acts because something’s logical or rational. Instead, God’s will and actions are perfectly aligned with the source or grounding of all logic and rationality, which is His nature. So what we think of as logic and rationality are our creaturely understanding of God’s nature.
For example, the principle of non-contradiction is grounded in the absolutely simple nature of God. Because God’s nature is simple and unified, it can’t contain contradictions, since contradictions in God’s nature would imply composition or division, both of which are contrary to His simple and unified nature.
Regarding P1 in your syllogism, by ‘Reason,’ do you mean the PSR, the mental faculty of reason, or something else? I’d agree the PSR is a necessary or eternal truth because it’s a principle rooted in God’s rational and intelligible nature, which is the source of all order and coherence in creation. The PSR reflects the idea that God acts for reasons that are consistent with His nature.
For P2, if C1 is meant to be a reductio ad absurdum, I don’t think most theists would say the PSR, necessary or eternal truths or the mental faculty of reason exists independently of God. If by ‘reason,’ you mean the principles of reason like the axioms of rational thought, then I don’t think theists would accept that either. So if this is meant as an internal critique, I don’t think it would describe most theists.
For P6, if this is an internal critique, I don’t think most theistic would agree the ability to change the PSR or any necessary or eternal truths is a power. As I understand it, a power is a capacity to bring about a specific effect, and something that’s impossible lacks any capacity. Necessary truths lack the capacity for change because they’re rooted in God’s immutable nature.
I hope my perspective makes sense, and I’m always open to further discussion or clarification if anything I’ve said isn’t clear.
Thank you for your thoughtful and respectful response. I have addressed each of your points. This article relates closely to the article on omnipotence I have made previously, so not all the points have been carried over. Let me know if you have any thoughts on the below.
>>When you say God has a nature He cannot change, at least under classical theism, change requires potentiality because it involves a transition from one state to another, and potentiality implies imperfection since it indicates dependence, incompleteness or unfulfilled capacity. So that’s why what you describe as a flaw (God’s immutability) is actually an essential feature of His perfect, independent and complete nature.
The article isn't about whether God himself can change, but whether he can truly *create* change. Yet because change is governed and explained by logical causation under the PSR, there is no room for an omnipotent God to create change, as he cannot alter this logical structure.
>>God’s immutability doesn’t entail that He’s restricted by logic, as I'll try to explain. Logic is just the reflection in the created order of God’s rational nature, including His logical mind. It’s not that the principles of logic restrain God, but that what it means to be perfect is to never have the ability to be imperfect. Acting illogically or irrationally would be imperfect. Nor is it the case that something’s logical or rational merely because God does it, or that God acts because something’s logical or rational. Instead, God’s will and actions are perfectly aligned with the source or grounding of all logic and rationality, which is His nature. So what we think of as logic and rationality are our creaturely understanding of God’s nature.
I disagree that logic is the reflection of God's nature. 1=1 is true regardless of God's power or creation. We can imagine 2 universes. One where God does exist and one where he doesn't. 1=1 would be necessarily true in both, entirely independent of God's will in the "God exists" universe. Moreover, if you say that God has a nature, then you accept that he is still bound by logic. An omnipotent being isn't bound by anything. Logic is the ultimate governor either way.
>>For example, the principle of non-contradiction is grounded in the absolutely simple nature of God. Because God’s nature is simple and unified, it can’t contain contradictions, since contradictions in God’s nature would imply composition or division, both of which are contrary to His simple and unified nature.
I disagree, the PNC is axiomatic and self-evident. 1 cannot equal 2, whether or not God wills it. If you say God can't will otherwise because of his nature, then you don't have omnipotence, as a truly omnipotent being wouldn't be restricted by such a nature.
>>Regarding P1 in your syllogism, by ‘Reason,’ do you mean the PSR, the mental faculty of reason, or something else? I’d agree the PSR is a necessary or eternal truth because it’s a principle rooted in God’s rational and intelligible nature, which is the source of all order and coherence in creation. The PSR reflects the idea that God acts for reasons that are consistent with His nature.
I described "Reason" is more detail in prior articles, but its not a mental capacity, it is objective, abstract and platonic. For our purposes, we can understand "Reason" as the laws of thought (LI, LNC, LEM). These laws are necessarily true in all possible worlds. (maybe I'll edit reason to logic for this purpose).
>>For P2, if C1 is meant to be a reductio ad absurdum, I don’t think most theists would say the PSR, necessary or eternal truths or the mental faculty of reason exists independently of God. If by ‘reason,’ you mean the principles of reason like the axioms of rational thought, then I don’t think theists would accept that either. So if this is meant as an internal critique, I don’t think it would describe most theists.
C1 isn't the heart of my argument, which is instead C3 and C4. From what I understand most theists accept C1, but try to separate God's inability to change necessary truths from his ability to change contingent truths. As the rest of the argument shows, these truths are not separate (at least not under the PSR), as contingent truths supervene on necessary truths. You can't truly change contingent truths without also changing necessary truths.
>>For P6, if this is an internal critique, I don’t think most theistic would agree the ability to change the PSR or any necessary or eternal truths is a power. As I understand it, a power is a capacity to bring about a specific effect, and something that’s impossible lacks any capacity. Necessary truths lack the capacity for change because they’re rooted in God’s immutable nature.
Yes, something that is impossible necessarily lacks capacity, and not even God can give it capacity, limiting his "omnipotence" (which by definition, can't be limited). If God can't give it capacity due to an "immutable" nature, then he is a slave to his nature (also not omnipotent).
Rather than focusing on where we disagree, it might be more constructive in this case to concentrate on where we agree. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I thought you seemed to agree with the following premises. If so, then the conclusion naturally follows.
If something is a power, then it has the capacity to bring about a specific effect. (If P, then Q)
Impossible things lack the capacity to bring about specific effects. (¬Q)
Therefore, impossible things are not powers. (¬P modus tollens)
Apply this to contradictions, then the syllogism goes as follows:
If something is a power, then it has the capacity to bring about a specific effect.
(If P, then Q)
The ability to make contradictions real lacks the capacity to bring about a specific effect (since contradictions cannot be realized).
(¬Q)
Therefore, the ability to make contradictions real is not a power.
(¬P modus tollens)
But my understanding of your rebuttal was that the inability to give capacity to impossible things or make them possible is a limitation of God’s omnipotence. I think I can explain why it's a mistaken inference to think that being unable to bring about a specific effect is necessarily a limitation of an ability.
For example, an omni-being is unable to be ignorant or evil. But omniscience or omnibenevolence are not limited by being unable to be ignorant or evil. That is because ignorance and evil are privations (or absences of something that ought to be present). Privations do not have a positive ontological status and are non-being. Ignorance and evil are instead the absence of knowledge and goodness. I’m not denying that evil has negative effects, but evil is rightly understood as the absence of something that is due (namely, goodness.) Likewise, contradictions are also non-being. They are the absence of logical coherence. For the same reason that being unable to be evil is not a limitation of omnibenevolence (because goodness is a privation, not an object of knowledge), being unable to perform a contradiction or make them possible is not a limitation of omnipotence (because contradictions are a privation, not an object of power).
>>If something is a power, then it has the capacity to bring about a specific effect. (If P, then Q)
>>Impossible things lack the capacity to bring about specific effects. (¬Q)
>>Therefore, impossible things are not powers. (¬P modus tollens)
P1 is already assuming that powers are only things that are "possible" to do. As discussed in (A4) and (A7), this is misguided and arbitrary. "Power" is the ability to bring about effects. If a certain "power" is impossible to have, then true omnipotence is already off the table, as some powers are impossible. Just because a power would be impossible to have doesn't mean that it's not a power, it just means that true omnipotence is nonsense. If something is impossible, the concept isn't revised to make it possible, the burden is still on the person who claims to do the impossible. In fact, doing the impossible would be the only true power that can make God "God."
Otherwise, this is to create a tautology. If powers are things that are only possible to do, then "power" becomes meaningless. It's impossible for me to jump to the moon (as given my physical state, such an inability would not be nonsensical). Therefore, me jumping to the moon is not a power, (I lack the capacity to bring about that effect due to the laws of physics) for how can my physical state possibly do that.
>>For example, an omni-being is unable to be ignorant or evil. But omniscience or omnibenevolence are not limited by being unable to be ignorant or evil. That is because ignorance and evil are privations (or absences of something that ought to be present).
This is an arbitrary asymmetry between good and evil. Clearly, a person capable of committing evil has broader abilities (or power), than someone restricted by morality. They would have more options at their disposal to produce effects. Its warping already clear meanings to produce an asymmetry to say that someone not restricted by morality somehow has less powers than someone who is, when its clear they have more. Any form of restrictions (including morality) serve as limits to power, which is antithetical to true omnipotence.
Thank you for your response. Your moon-jumping parody made a good point that physically impossible things are still examples of power, so I'll try refining the argument using power as you defined it.
1. If and only if something does not have the ability to bring about effects, then it is not a form or example of power. (¬P ↔ ¬Q)
2. Whatever is logically impossible does not have the ability to bring about effects. (¬P)
3. Therefore, whatever is logically impossible is not a form or example of power. (¬Q modus ponens)
P1 is the biconditional inference of the necessary and sufficient conditions of power, per your definition. It's not assuming that a power is only something that is logically possible because it does not directly state or presuppose the conclusion but rather provides your general definition of power. A presupposing premise would have said "possible ability" or "possible effects." If the definition were changed to include "possible ability" or "possible effects," then the definition itself would be assuming that impossible things are not powers, which your moon-jumping parody pointed out is incorrect since physically impossible things for one thing could be physically possible for another.
For P2, I assumed you would agree since your argument included the premise that real contradictions don't exist, which would entail they can't bring about effects.
What do you think of P1 and P2?
Thanks again for the conversation. Unless you have any questions for me, I think I’ll wrap up my comments here.
I would not agree with any of those premises, as this is the definition of omnipotence you had adopted which I had said was meaningless, but I do agree with your conclusion. Once you accept the PSR, then you accept a logical structure to the universe, where bringing about any self-willed uncaused effect would be impossible and there would be no such thing as "power" (this is just the determinist agreement applied to power rather than free will). Under that definition, no one would have any power and God could never be omnipotent. Under any definition you use for omnipotence/power, you can't get an omnipotent God.
My only question is, given a logically structured universe governed by universally true axioms, and that no power can break free from this logical structure, how can omnipotence even be possible? Isn't God logically impossible and necessarily false in all possible worlds?
Correct me if I’m wrong, but this is meant to be an internal critique, so my understanding is that you’re making the critique from within the omni-theist’s own framework to show an internal contradiction. I just wanted to say that I know written comments can sometimes come across as more intense or hostile than intended, so I hope it’s clear that I’m just sharing my perspective in good faith (pun intended).
When you say God has a nature He cannot change, at least under classical theism, change requires potentiality because it involves a transition from one state to another, and potentiality implies imperfection since it indicates dependence, incompleteness or unfulfilled capacity. So that’s why what you describe as a flaw (God’s immutability) is actually an essential feature of His perfect, independent and complete nature.
God’s immutability doesn’t entail that He’s restricted by logic, as I'll try to explain. Logic is just the reflection in the created order of God’s rational nature, including His logical mind. It’s not that the principles of logic restrain God, but that what it means to be perfect is to never have the ability to be imperfect. Acting illogically or irrationally would be imperfect. Nor is it the case that something’s logical or rational merely because God does it, or that God acts because something’s logical or rational. Instead, God’s will and actions are perfectly aligned with the source or grounding of all logic and rationality, which is His nature. So what we think of as logic and rationality are our creaturely understanding of God’s nature.
For example, the principle of non-contradiction is grounded in the absolutely simple nature of God. Because God’s nature is simple and unified, it can’t contain contradictions, since contradictions in God’s nature would imply composition or division, both of which are contrary to His simple and unified nature.
Regarding P1 in your syllogism, by ‘Reason,’ do you mean the PSR, the mental faculty of reason, or something else? I’d agree the PSR is a necessary or eternal truth because it’s a principle rooted in God’s rational and intelligible nature, which is the source of all order and coherence in creation. The PSR reflects the idea that God acts for reasons that are consistent with His nature.
For P2, if C1 is meant to be a reductio ad absurdum, I don’t think most theists would say the PSR, necessary or eternal truths or the mental faculty of reason exists independently of God. If by ‘reason,’ you mean the principles of reason like the axioms of rational thought, then I don’t think theists would accept that either. So if this is meant as an internal critique, I don’t think it would describe most theists.
For P6, if this is an internal critique, I don’t think most theistic would agree the ability to change the PSR or any necessary or eternal truths is a power. As I understand it, a power is a capacity to bring about a specific effect, and something that’s impossible lacks any capacity. Necessary truths lack the capacity for change because they’re rooted in God’s immutable nature.
I hope my perspective makes sense, and I’m always open to further discussion or clarification if anything I’ve said isn’t clear.
Thank you for your thoughtful and respectful response. I have addressed each of your points. This article relates closely to the article on omnipotence I have made previously, so not all the points have been carried over. Let me know if you have any thoughts on the below.
>>When you say God has a nature He cannot change, at least under classical theism, change requires potentiality because it involves a transition from one state to another, and potentiality implies imperfection since it indicates dependence, incompleteness or unfulfilled capacity. So that’s why what you describe as a flaw (God’s immutability) is actually an essential feature of His perfect, independent and complete nature.
The article isn't about whether God himself can change, but whether he can truly *create* change. Yet because change is governed and explained by logical causation under the PSR, there is no room for an omnipotent God to create change, as he cannot alter this logical structure.
>>God’s immutability doesn’t entail that He’s restricted by logic, as I'll try to explain. Logic is just the reflection in the created order of God’s rational nature, including His logical mind. It’s not that the principles of logic restrain God, but that what it means to be perfect is to never have the ability to be imperfect. Acting illogically or irrationally would be imperfect. Nor is it the case that something’s logical or rational merely because God does it, or that God acts because something’s logical or rational. Instead, God’s will and actions are perfectly aligned with the source or grounding of all logic and rationality, which is His nature. So what we think of as logic and rationality are our creaturely understanding of God’s nature.
I disagree that logic is the reflection of God's nature. 1=1 is true regardless of God's power or creation. We can imagine 2 universes. One where God does exist and one where he doesn't. 1=1 would be necessarily true in both, entirely independent of God's will in the "God exists" universe. Moreover, if you say that God has a nature, then you accept that he is still bound by logic. An omnipotent being isn't bound by anything. Logic is the ultimate governor either way.
>>For example, the principle of non-contradiction is grounded in the absolutely simple nature of God. Because God’s nature is simple and unified, it can’t contain contradictions, since contradictions in God’s nature would imply composition or division, both of which are contrary to His simple and unified nature.
I disagree, the PNC is axiomatic and self-evident. 1 cannot equal 2, whether or not God wills it. If you say God can't will otherwise because of his nature, then you don't have omnipotence, as a truly omnipotent being wouldn't be restricted by such a nature.
>>Regarding P1 in your syllogism, by ‘Reason,’ do you mean the PSR, the mental faculty of reason, or something else? I’d agree the PSR is a necessary or eternal truth because it’s a principle rooted in God’s rational and intelligible nature, which is the source of all order and coherence in creation. The PSR reflects the idea that God acts for reasons that are consistent with His nature.
I described "Reason" is more detail in prior articles, but its not a mental capacity, it is objective, abstract and platonic. For our purposes, we can understand "Reason" as the laws of thought (LI, LNC, LEM). These laws are necessarily true in all possible worlds. (maybe I'll edit reason to logic for this purpose).
>>For P2, if C1 is meant to be a reductio ad absurdum, I don’t think most theists would say the PSR, necessary or eternal truths or the mental faculty of reason exists independently of God. If by ‘reason,’ you mean the principles of reason like the axioms of rational thought, then I don’t think theists would accept that either. So if this is meant as an internal critique, I don’t think it would describe most theists.
C1 isn't the heart of my argument, which is instead C3 and C4. From what I understand most theists accept C1, but try to separate God's inability to change necessary truths from his ability to change contingent truths. As the rest of the argument shows, these truths are not separate (at least not under the PSR), as contingent truths supervene on necessary truths. You can't truly change contingent truths without also changing necessary truths.
>>For P6, if this is an internal critique, I don’t think most theistic would agree the ability to change the PSR or any necessary or eternal truths is a power. As I understand it, a power is a capacity to bring about a specific effect, and something that’s impossible lacks any capacity. Necessary truths lack the capacity for change because they’re rooted in God’s immutable nature.
Yes, something that is impossible necessarily lacks capacity, and not even God can give it capacity, limiting his "omnipotence" (which by definition, can't be limited). If God can't give it capacity due to an "immutable" nature, then he is a slave to his nature (also not omnipotent).
Rather than focusing on where we disagree, it might be more constructive in this case to concentrate on where we agree. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I thought you seemed to agree with the following premises. If so, then the conclusion naturally follows.
If something is a power, then it has the capacity to bring about a specific effect. (If P, then Q)
Impossible things lack the capacity to bring about specific effects. (¬Q)
Therefore, impossible things are not powers. (¬P modus tollens)
Apply this to contradictions, then the syllogism goes as follows:
If something is a power, then it has the capacity to bring about a specific effect.
(If P, then Q)
The ability to make contradictions real lacks the capacity to bring about a specific effect (since contradictions cannot be realized).
(¬Q)
Therefore, the ability to make contradictions real is not a power.
(¬P modus tollens)
But my understanding of your rebuttal was that the inability to give capacity to impossible things or make them possible is a limitation of God’s omnipotence. I think I can explain why it's a mistaken inference to think that being unable to bring about a specific effect is necessarily a limitation of an ability.
For example, an omni-being is unable to be ignorant or evil. But omniscience or omnibenevolence are not limited by being unable to be ignorant or evil. That is because ignorance and evil are privations (or absences of something that ought to be present). Privations do not have a positive ontological status and are non-being. Ignorance and evil are instead the absence of knowledge and goodness. I’m not denying that evil has negative effects, but evil is rightly understood as the absence of something that is due (namely, goodness.) Likewise, contradictions are also non-being. They are the absence of logical coherence. For the same reason that being unable to be evil is not a limitation of omnibenevolence (because goodness is a privation, not an object of knowledge), being unable to perform a contradiction or make them possible is not a limitation of omnipotence (because contradictions are a privation, not an object of power).
>>If something is a power, then it has the capacity to bring about a specific effect. (If P, then Q)
>>Impossible things lack the capacity to bring about specific effects. (¬Q)
>>Therefore, impossible things are not powers. (¬P modus tollens)
P1 is already assuming that powers are only things that are "possible" to do. As discussed in (A4) and (A7), this is misguided and arbitrary. "Power" is the ability to bring about effects. If a certain "power" is impossible to have, then true omnipotence is already off the table, as some powers are impossible. Just because a power would be impossible to have doesn't mean that it's not a power, it just means that true omnipotence is nonsense. If something is impossible, the concept isn't revised to make it possible, the burden is still on the person who claims to do the impossible. In fact, doing the impossible would be the only true power that can make God "God."
Otherwise, this is to create a tautology. If powers are things that are only possible to do, then "power" becomes meaningless. It's impossible for me to jump to the moon (as given my physical state, such an inability would not be nonsensical). Therefore, me jumping to the moon is not a power, (I lack the capacity to bring about that effect due to the laws of physics) for how can my physical state possibly do that.
>>For example, an omni-being is unable to be ignorant or evil. But omniscience or omnibenevolence are not limited by being unable to be ignorant or evil. That is because ignorance and evil are privations (or absences of something that ought to be present).
This is an arbitrary asymmetry between good and evil. Clearly, a person capable of committing evil has broader abilities (or power), than someone restricted by morality. They would have more options at their disposal to produce effects. Its warping already clear meanings to produce an asymmetry to say that someone not restricted by morality somehow has less powers than someone who is, when its clear they have more. Any form of restrictions (including morality) serve as limits to power, which is antithetical to true omnipotence.
Thank you for your response. Your moon-jumping parody made a good point that physically impossible things are still examples of power, so I'll try refining the argument using power as you defined it.
1. If and only if something does not have the ability to bring about effects, then it is not a form or example of power. (¬P ↔ ¬Q)
2. Whatever is logically impossible does not have the ability to bring about effects. (¬P)
3. Therefore, whatever is logically impossible is not a form or example of power. (¬Q modus ponens)
P1 is the biconditional inference of the necessary and sufficient conditions of power, per your definition. It's not assuming that a power is only something that is logically possible because it does not directly state or presuppose the conclusion but rather provides your general definition of power. A presupposing premise would have said "possible ability" or "possible effects." If the definition were changed to include "possible ability" or "possible effects," then the definition itself would be assuming that impossible things are not powers, which your moon-jumping parody pointed out is incorrect since physically impossible things for one thing could be physically possible for another.
For P2, I assumed you would agree since your argument included the premise that real contradictions don't exist, which would entail they can't bring about effects.
What do you think of P1 and P2?
Thanks again for the conversation. Unless you have any questions for me, I think I’ll wrap up my comments here.
I would not agree with any of those premises, as this is the definition of omnipotence you had adopted which I had said was meaningless, but I do agree with your conclusion. Once you accept the PSR, then you accept a logical structure to the universe, where bringing about any self-willed uncaused effect would be impossible and there would be no such thing as "power" (this is just the determinist agreement applied to power rather than free will). Under that definition, no one would have any power and God could never be omnipotent. Under any definition you use for omnipotence/power, you can't get an omnipotent God.
My only question is, given a logically structured universe governed by universally true axioms, and that no power can break free from this logical structure, how can omnipotence even be possible? Isn't God logically impossible and necessarily false in all possible worlds?