Somewhat related, I was in a comment thread elsewhere about the problem of evil, and the conclusion was that dropping omnipotence is arguably the simplest way out of that conundrum. A deity wouldn't even need to be necessarily omnipotent to start the ball rolling on a universe made of of finite matter, or to be more powerful than all of humanity.
Sure, but then we wouldn’t have an omnipotent being who would have created morality, free will, causation or other fundamental concepts, which would exist independent of that being. We’d just have a first domino to fall. And there is nothing special about the first, last or 4838582th domino. Moreover, without omnipotence, we’d have higher truths that would exist beyond God’s powers, which anyone, even an ordinary domino, could understand. Once you don’t have God, these truths are open for our examination.
And thank you, much appreciated for the engagement and kind words! And this post is just a start. Look out for post on the PSR. That’s where the good stuff will be. This version of the omnipotence paradox depends on the PSR, and killing God is just one of its powers.
When considering "gods" the definition can include those who are not omnipotent or omniscient, yet are more powerful and knowledgeable than humans, in the way that humans are more knowledgeable than a primate. This isn't what classical theists are aiming for, so I suspect it would commit the pop theological sin of "being unsatisfying".
Personally, I find religion much more fascinating from a literary or Jungian approach, than trying to shoehorn mythos and meaning into platonic speculation or classical theism.
And many humans are more powerful and knowledgable than myself. But I don't see them as the fundamental nature of reality, only philosophy has that role. Moreover, under the PSR, there is nothing more fundamental about such a "more" powerful being. We are all equal slaves of necessity.
I agree with you that religion is fascinating from a metaphorical/Jungian perspective and serves as a window into the human mind of archetypes. But this isn't what thiests are defending. Eventually, this substack will turn to Jung and aesthetics. But I'd rather settle the philosophy first.
It occurs to me: couldn't A3 be argued by denying God has "higher systems" above him, and that he is simply the author of logic that reflects his mind, full stop?
I may be getting ahead of myself, but do you have the neoplatonic One in mind or something? In Egypt, the concept of Ma'at is a rough equivalent to the necessary truths of reason and a coherent universe.
Many deities as described in antiquity seemed to not be fundamental to the universe either, at least not to the extent "God" became under classical theism. Even Yahweh gets surprised and has regrets, even if he has superpowers. Spinoza equates God with Nature, but it seems as if God loses any uniqueness in this schema and becomes superfluous.
My substack delves into Jungian thought as well, and I think approaches like it are the best way to really salvage religion. It also has the benefit of actually trying to describe HOW people use religion anyway, rather than make propositional statements about God.
I'm fine with religion. But false deities shouldn't be confused with the true, absolute, ultimate, and infinite. False gods have been used as a metaphor to get a sense of it, but to truly understand it, we must see past metaphor. But this comment is getting well far ahead of this substack.
There's a ton I disagree with here, but I just want to constrain myself to one section so as to avoid a (principally) explosive comment thread.
> However, assuming that God is "necessary" begs the question. We cannot answer the question "Does God exist?" simply by asserting His necessary existence. The Theist must first demonstrate that God is necessary, meaning that He must exist in every possible world. If God is necessary, then even the possibility of His non-existence would be a contradiction.
I think this is at least partly confused. Most theists take God's necessity to be an entailment of his defining property (say, maximal perfection just so we have something to work with). These sorts of claims can be understood conditionally (i.e. if God exists, he exists necessarily) which is precisely what motivates modal flavors of ontological arguments. This sort of reply isn't saying that God exists necessarily, it's saying that a contingent being *can't be God*.
> God is not necessary because it is conceivable that a world could exist without Him. Therefore, God does not have to exist, implying that He cannot be considered necessary. If God's existence is dependent on something higher, then He cannot be truly omnipotent. A true "God" would not be contingent.
This assumes conceivability implies possibility, which I think is straightforwardly false, and can plausibly rejected by theists.
> Thus, the only way to salvage the concept of God would be to consider Him a brute fact—contingent, yes, but not explained by anything else, as that would make Him a subject. By definition, a truly omnipotent being cannot be the subject of anything. This is why God could only exist as a brute fact. However, under the PSR, brute facts do not exist—so, neither can God.
This is also, I think, either contentious or confused. A theist might consider God *brutely necessary*. Depending on the construal of the PSR in question, one might think only contingent facts require explanations. In which case, God's brute necessity is on the table, particularly if one denies the conceivability argument outlined above. In any case, it's not clear from the definition given why a 'truly omnipotent' (I take this to just mean 'omnipotent') being couldn't be a 'subject'. In fact, I think theists are committed to thinking God is a subject! He's an agent! Now, presumably you mean 'subject to laws' or 'constrained in some way' but the theist who takes God's omnipotence to be something like "ability to bring about any logically possible state of affairs" surely isn't going to be subject (pun intended) to such an entailment.
Okay, as I said, more to say here but I wanted to restrict my comments to one section. Despite my criticisms I think this is an interesting argument!
Thanks for the review and feel free to explode away! I'll address your points in turn
>I think this is at least partly confused. Most theists take God's necessity to be an entailment of his defining property (say, maximal perfection just so we have something to work with). These sorts of claims can be understood conditionally (i.e. if God exists, he exists necessarily) which is precisely what motivates modal flavors of ontological arguments. This sort of reply isn't saying that God exists necessarily, it's saying that a contingent being *can't be God*.
Stating that God is necessary is begging the question (on the question of his existence). You have to either (1) prove god is necessary or (2) accept God as contingent (in which case the argument would apply)
>This assumes conceivability implies possibility, which I think is straightforwardly false, and can plausibly rejected by theists.
I agree and have criticized this point as well. But here, this is an argument against (1) above. I can't imagine 1+1 equalling anything other than 2, or a bachelor being married, as these are necessary truths. But I *can* imagine a universe without a God, suggesting God isn't necessary.
>This is also, I think, either contentious or confused. A theist might consider God *brutely necessary*. Depending on the construal of the PSR in question, one might think only contingent facts require explanations. In which case, God's brute necessity is on the table, particularly if one denies the conceivability argument outlined above. In any case, it's not clear from the definition given why a 'truly omnipotent' (I take this to just mean 'omnipotent') being couldn't be a 'subject'. In fact, I think theists are committed to thinking God is a subject! He's an agent! Now, presumably you mean 'subject to laws' or 'constrained in some way' but the theist who takes God's omnipotence to be something like "ability to bring about any logically possible state of affairs" surely isn't going to be subject (pun intended) to such an entailment.
This is also just asserting God. "brute necessity" is also a contradiction (necessary from what?). You either have to show (1) above (prove God's necessity), or accept (2), in which case this article shows that God can't be omnipotent.
> Stating that God is necessary is begging the question (on the question of his existence). You have to either (1) prove god is necessary or (2) accept God as contingent (in which case the argument would apply)
Yea, what I'm saying is that when theists say "God is necessary" they typically mean God is by definition necessary i.e. If God exists he exists necessarily. Whether *that* is true is just a matter of definition. Whether he, in fact, exists necessarily obviously comes right after. I'm not sympathetic to those arguments, but some theists might be.
> I agree and have criticized this point as well. But here, this is an argument against (1) above. I can't imagine 1+1 equalling anything other than 2, or a bachelor being married, as these are necessary truths. But I *can* imagine a universe without a God, suggesting God isn't necessary.
Maybe I'm not understanding you, but is the argument here supposed to be contra conceivability implies possibility? Because I don't see how it moves the needle, I agree if someone agrees to C implies P that being able to conceive of a godless world would entail he couldn't be necessary. I just think theists should reject C implies P.
> This is also just asserting God. "brute necessity" is also a contradiction (necessary from what?).
As above, I take this move to just be hashing out terms, then the theist can provide evidence of his necessity. Also brute necessity wouldn't be a contradiction, unless we have different understandings of bruteness and necessity. I take bruteness to mean an absence of an explanation, and necessity to mean existing in all possible worlds. If something is brutely necessary, then the fact that it exists necessarily is unexplained. I don't see a contradiction on that understanding.
> You either have to show (1) above (prove God's necessity), or accept (2), in which case this article shows that God can't be omnipotent.
Roughly just reiterating what I said above. Whether God is a necessary being is a distinct question from whether he *in fact* exists necessarily. If the theist understands God to be a necessary being as a matter of definition, you're just talking past them if the entity at hand is contingent.
>Yea, what I'm saying is that when theists say "God is necessary" they typically mean God is by definition necessary i.e. If God exists he exists necessarily. Whether *that* is true is just a matter of definition. Whether he, in fact, exists necessarily obviously comes right after. I'm not sympathetic to those arguments, but some theists might be.
I agree. This is the problem with the ontological argument. If God exists he *has* to exist. And if he doesn't exist he *can't* exist. The ontological argument is high stakes. He either does or does not exist necessarily. This argument shows how he cannot exist necessarily, while theists have failed to provide an argument for why he necessarily does exist (in which case, where is he?).
Sorry now I worry I'm confused. I took the appeal to C implies P to be your argument against God being able to exist necessarily. I was then saying that I think the theist can very reasonably reject C implies P. You say "God is not necessary because it is conceivable that a world could exist without Him." but this only acts as a counter example if you accept that C implies P (of course because, the idea with this is that if you can conceive of God's non existence, his non-existence is possible, therefore he isn't necessary. But that only works with C implies P).
Correct me if I’m wrong, but this is meant to be an internal critique, so my understanding is that you’re making the critique from within the omni-theist’s own framework to show an internal contradiction. I just wanted to say that I know written comments can sometimes come across as more intense or hostile than intended, so I hope it’s clear that I’m just sharing my perspective in good faith (pun intended).
When you say God has a nature He cannot change, at least under classical theism, change requires potentiality because it involves a transition from one state to another, and potentiality implies imperfection since it indicates dependence, incompleteness or unfulfilled capacity. So that’s why what you describe as a flaw (God’s immutability) is actually an essential feature of His perfect, independent and complete nature.
God’s immutability doesn’t entail that He’s restricted by logic, as I'll try to explain. Logic is just the reflection in the created order of God’s rational nature, including His logical mind. It’s not that the principles of logic restrain God, but that what it means to be perfect is to never have the ability to be imperfect. Acting illogically or irrationally would be imperfect. Nor is it the case that something’s logical or rational merely because God does it, or that God acts because something’s logical or rational. Instead, God’s will and actions are perfectly aligned with the source or grounding of all logic and rationality, which is His nature. So what we think of as logic and rationality are our creaturely understanding of God’s nature.
For example, the principle of non-contradiction is grounded in the absolutely simple nature of God. Because God’s nature is simple and unified, it can’t contain contradictions, since contradictions in God’s nature would imply composition or division, both of which are contrary to His simple and unified nature.
Regarding P1 in your syllogism, by ‘Reason,’ do you mean the PSR, the mental faculty of reason, or something else? I’d agree the PSR is a necessary or eternal truth because it’s a principle rooted in God’s rational and intelligible nature, which is the source of all order and coherence in creation. The PSR reflects the idea that God acts for reasons that are consistent with His nature.
For P2, if C1 is meant to be a reductio ad absurdum, I don’t think most theists would say the PSR, necessary or eternal truths or the mental faculty of reason exists independently of God. If by ‘reason,’ you mean the principles of reason like the axioms of rational thought, then I don’t think theists would accept that either. So if this is meant as an internal critique, I don’t think it would describe most theists.
For P6, if this is an internal critique, I don’t think most theistic would agree the ability to change the PSR or any necessary or eternal truths is a power. As I understand it, a power is a capacity to bring about a specific effect, and something that’s impossible lacks any capacity. Necessary truths lack the capacity for change because they’re rooted in God’s immutable nature.
I hope my perspective makes sense, and I’m always open to further discussion or clarification if anything I’ve said isn’t clear.
Thank you for your thoughtful and respectful response. I have addressed each of your points. This article relates closely to the article on omnipotence I have made previously, so not all the points have been carried over. Let me know if you have any thoughts on the below.
>>When you say God has a nature He cannot change, at least under classical theism, change requires potentiality because it involves a transition from one state to another, and potentiality implies imperfection since it indicates dependence, incompleteness or unfulfilled capacity. So that’s why what you describe as a flaw (God’s immutability) is actually an essential feature of His perfect, independent and complete nature.
The article isn't about whether God himself can change, but whether he can truly *create* change. Yet because change is governed and explained by logical causation under the PSR, there is no room for an omnipotent God to create change, as he cannot alter this logical structure.
>>God’s immutability doesn’t entail that He’s restricted by logic, as I'll try to explain. Logic is just the reflection in the created order of God’s rational nature, including His logical mind. It’s not that the principles of logic restrain God, but that what it means to be perfect is to never have the ability to be imperfect. Acting illogically or irrationally would be imperfect. Nor is it the case that something’s logical or rational merely because God does it, or that God acts because something’s logical or rational. Instead, God’s will and actions are perfectly aligned with the source or grounding of all logic and rationality, which is His nature. So what we think of as logic and rationality are our creaturely understanding of God’s nature.
I disagree that logic is the reflection of God's nature. 1=1 is true regardless of God's power or creation. We can imagine 2 universes. One where God does exist and one where he doesn't. 1=1 would be necessarily true in both, entirely independent of God's will in the "God exists" universe. Moreover, if you say that God has a nature, then you accept that he is still bound by logic. An omnipotent being isn't bound by anything. Logic is the ultimate governor either way.
>>For example, the principle of non-contradiction is grounded in the absolutely simple nature of God. Because God’s nature is simple and unified, it can’t contain contradictions, since contradictions in God’s nature would imply composition or division, both of which are contrary to His simple and unified nature.
I disagree, the PNC is axiomatic and self-evident. 1 cannot equal 2, whether or not God wills it. If you say God can't will otherwise because of his nature, then you don't have omnipotence, as a truly omnipotent being wouldn't be restricted by such a nature.
>>Regarding P1 in your syllogism, by ‘Reason,’ do you mean the PSR, the mental faculty of reason, or something else? I’d agree the PSR is a necessary or eternal truth because it’s a principle rooted in God’s rational and intelligible nature, which is the source of all order and coherence in creation. The PSR reflects the idea that God acts for reasons that are consistent with His nature.
I described "Reason" is more detail in prior articles, but its not a mental capacity, it is objective, abstract and platonic. For our purposes, we can understand "Reason" as the laws of thought (LI, LNC, LEM). These laws are necessarily true in all possible worlds. (maybe I'll edit reason to logic for this purpose).
>>For P2, if C1 is meant to be a reductio ad absurdum, I don’t think most theists would say the PSR, necessary or eternal truths or the mental faculty of reason exists independently of God. If by ‘reason,’ you mean the principles of reason like the axioms of rational thought, then I don’t think theists would accept that either. So if this is meant as an internal critique, I don’t think it would describe most theists.
C1 isn't the heart of my argument, which is instead C3 and C4. From what I understand most theists accept C1, but try to separate God's inability to change necessary truths from his ability to change contingent truths. As the rest of the argument shows, these truths are not separate (at least not under the PSR), as contingent truths supervene on necessary truths. You can't truly change contingent truths without also changing necessary truths.
>>For P6, if this is an internal critique, I don’t think most theistic would agree the ability to change the PSR or any necessary or eternal truths is a power. As I understand it, a power is a capacity to bring about a specific effect, and something that’s impossible lacks any capacity. Necessary truths lack the capacity for change because they’re rooted in God’s immutable nature.
Yes, something that is impossible necessarily lacks capacity, and not even God can give it capacity, limiting his "omnipotence" (which by definition, can't be limited). If God can't give it capacity due to an "immutable" nature, then he is a slave to his nature (also not omnipotent).
Rather than focusing on where we disagree, it might be more constructive in this case to concentrate on where we agree. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I thought you seemed to agree with the following premises. If so, then the conclusion naturally follows.
If something is a power, then it has the capacity to bring about a specific effect. (If P, then Q)
Impossible things lack the capacity to bring about specific effects. (¬Q)
Therefore, impossible things are not powers. (¬P modus tollens)
Apply this to contradictions, then the syllogism goes as follows:
If something is a power, then it has the capacity to bring about a specific effect.
(If P, then Q)
The ability to make contradictions real lacks the capacity to bring about a specific effect (since contradictions cannot be realized).
(¬Q)
Therefore, the ability to make contradictions real is not a power.
(¬P modus tollens)
But my understanding of your rebuttal was that the inability to give capacity to impossible things or make them possible is a limitation of God’s omnipotence. I think I can explain why it's a mistaken inference to think that being unable to bring about a specific effect is necessarily a limitation of an ability.
For example, an omni-being is unable to be ignorant or evil. But omniscience or omnibenevolence are not limited by being unable to be ignorant or evil. That is because ignorance and evil are privations (or absences of something that ought to be present). Privations do not have a positive ontological status and are non-being. Ignorance and evil are instead the absence of knowledge and goodness. I’m not denying that evil has negative effects, but evil is rightly understood as the absence of something that is due (namely, goodness.) Likewise, contradictions are also non-being. They are the absence of logical coherence. For the same reason that being unable to be evil is not a limitation of omnibenevolence (because goodness is a privation, not an object of knowledge), being unable to perform a contradiction or make them possible is not a limitation of omnipotence (because contradictions are a privation, not an object of power).
>>If something is a power, then it has the capacity to bring about a specific effect. (If P, then Q)
>>Impossible things lack the capacity to bring about specific effects. (¬Q)
>>Therefore, impossible things are not powers. (¬P modus tollens)
P1 is already assuming that powers are only things that are "possible" to do. As discussed in (A4) and (A7), this is misguided and arbitrary. "Power" is the ability to bring about effects. If a certain "power" is impossible to have, then true omnipotence is already off the table, as some powers are impossible. Just because a power would be impossible to have doesn't mean that it's not a power, it just means that true omnipotence is nonsense. If something is impossible, the concept isn't revised to make it possible, the burden is still on the person who claims to do the impossible. In fact, doing the impossible would be the only true power that can make God "God."
Otherwise, this is to create a tautology. If powers are things that are only possible to do, then "power" becomes meaningless. It's impossible for me to jump to the moon (as given my physical state, such an inability would not be nonsensical). Therefore, me jumping to the moon is not a power, (I lack the capacity to bring about that effect due to the laws of physics) for how can my physical state possibly do that.
>>For example, an omni-being is unable to be ignorant or evil. But omniscience or omnibenevolence are not limited by being unable to be ignorant or evil. That is because ignorance and evil are privations (or absences of something that ought to be present).
This is an arbitrary asymmetry between good and evil. Clearly, a person capable of committing evil has broader abilities (or power), than someone restricted by morality. They would have more options at their disposal to produce effects. Its warping already clear meanings to produce an asymmetry to say that someone not restricted by morality somehow has less powers than someone who is, when its clear they have more. Any form of restrictions (including morality) serve as limits to power, which is antithetical to true omnipotence.
Thank you for your response. Your moon-jumping parody made a good point that physically impossible things are still examples of power, so I'll try refining the argument using power as you defined it.
1. If and only if something does not have the ability to bring about effects, then it is not a form or example of power. (¬P ↔ ¬Q)
2. Whatever is logically impossible does not have the ability to bring about effects. (¬P)
3. Therefore, whatever is logically impossible is not a form or example of power. (¬Q modus ponens)
P1 is the biconditional inference of the necessary and sufficient conditions of power, per your definition. It's not assuming that a power is only something that is logically possible because it does not directly state or presuppose the conclusion but rather provides your general definition of power. A presupposing premise would have said "possible ability" or "possible effects." If the definition were changed to include "possible ability" or "possible effects," then the definition itself would be assuming that impossible things are not powers, which your moon-jumping parody pointed out is incorrect since physically impossible things for one thing could be physically possible for another.
For P2, I assumed you would agree since your argument included the premise that real contradictions don't exist, which would entail they can't bring about effects.
What do you think of P1 and P2?
Thanks again for the conversation. Unless you have any questions for me, I think I’ll wrap up my comments here.
I would not agree with any of those premises, as this is the definition of omnipotence you had adopted which I had said was meaningless, but I do agree with your conclusion. Once you accept the PSR, then you accept a logical structure to the universe, where bringing about any self-willed uncaused effect would be impossible and there would be no such thing as "power" (this is just the determinist agreement applied to power rather than free will). Under that definition, no one would have any power and God could never be omnipotent. Under any definition you use for omnipotence/power, you can't get an omnipotent God.
My only question is, given a logically structured universe governed by universally true axioms, and that no power can break free from this logical structure, how can omnipotence even be possible? Isn't God logically impossible and necessarily false in all possible worlds?
Somewhat related, I was in a comment thread elsewhere about the problem of evil, and the conclusion was that dropping omnipotence is arguably the simplest way out of that conundrum. A deity wouldn't even need to be necessarily omnipotent to start the ball rolling on a universe made of of finite matter, or to be more powerful than all of humanity.
An intriguing post for sure.
Sure, but then we wouldn’t have an omnipotent being who would have created morality, free will, causation or other fundamental concepts, which would exist independent of that being. We’d just have a first domino to fall. And there is nothing special about the first, last or 4838582th domino. Moreover, without omnipotence, we’d have higher truths that would exist beyond God’s powers, which anyone, even an ordinary domino, could understand. Once you don’t have God, these truths are open for our examination.
And thank you, much appreciated for the engagement and kind words! And this post is just a start. Look out for post on the PSR. That’s where the good stuff will be. This version of the omnipotence paradox depends on the PSR, and killing God is just one of its powers.
When considering "gods" the definition can include those who are not omnipotent or omniscient, yet are more powerful and knowledgeable than humans, in the way that humans are more knowledgeable than a primate. This isn't what classical theists are aiming for, so I suspect it would commit the pop theological sin of "being unsatisfying".
Personally, I find religion much more fascinating from a literary or Jungian approach, than trying to shoehorn mythos and meaning into platonic speculation or classical theism.
And many humans are more powerful and knowledgable than myself. But I don't see them as the fundamental nature of reality, only philosophy has that role. Moreover, under the PSR, there is nothing more fundamental about such a "more" powerful being. We are all equal slaves of necessity.
I agree with you that religion is fascinating from a metaphorical/Jungian perspective and serves as a window into the human mind of archetypes. But this isn't what thiests are defending. Eventually, this substack will turn to Jung and aesthetics. But I'd rather settle the philosophy first.
It occurs to me: couldn't A3 be argued by denying God has "higher systems" above him, and that he is simply the author of logic that reflects his mind, full stop?
There is a higher power above God. God cannot author necessary truths. 1=1 is true universally, with or without God.
It occurred to me this morning, in the interest of further steelmanning A3:
Could a theist simply deny that one can envision a universe without God?
Especially if he says God is the creator of reason and logic, even if it means he can be a less-than-omnipotent being?
I may be getting ahead of myself, but do you have the neoplatonic One in mind or something? In Egypt, the concept of Ma'at is a rough equivalent to the necessary truths of reason and a coherent universe.
Many deities as described in antiquity seemed to not be fundamental to the universe either, at least not to the extent "God" became under classical theism. Even Yahweh gets surprised and has regrets, even if he has superpowers. Spinoza equates God with Nature, but it seems as if God loses any uniqueness in this schema and becomes superfluous.
My substack delves into Jungian thought as well, and I think approaches like it are the best way to really salvage religion. It also has the benefit of actually trying to describe HOW people use religion anyway, rather than make propositional statements about God.
I'm fine with religion. But false deities shouldn't be confused with the true, absolute, ultimate, and infinite. False gods have been used as a metaphor to get a sense of it, but to truly understand it, we must see past metaphor. But this comment is getting well far ahead of this substack.
There's a ton I disagree with here, but I just want to constrain myself to one section so as to avoid a (principally) explosive comment thread.
> However, assuming that God is "necessary" begs the question. We cannot answer the question "Does God exist?" simply by asserting His necessary existence. The Theist must first demonstrate that God is necessary, meaning that He must exist in every possible world. If God is necessary, then even the possibility of His non-existence would be a contradiction.
I think this is at least partly confused. Most theists take God's necessity to be an entailment of his defining property (say, maximal perfection just so we have something to work with). These sorts of claims can be understood conditionally (i.e. if God exists, he exists necessarily) which is precisely what motivates modal flavors of ontological arguments. This sort of reply isn't saying that God exists necessarily, it's saying that a contingent being *can't be God*.
> God is not necessary because it is conceivable that a world could exist without Him. Therefore, God does not have to exist, implying that He cannot be considered necessary. If God's existence is dependent on something higher, then He cannot be truly omnipotent. A true "God" would not be contingent.
This assumes conceivability implies possibility, which I think is straightforwardly false, and can plausibly rejected by theists.
> Thus, the only way to salvage the concept of God would be to consider Him a brute fact—contingent, yes, but not explained by anything else, as that would make Him a subject. By definition, a truly omnipotent being cannot be the subject of anything. This is why God could only exist as a brute fact. However, under the PSR, brute facts do not exist—so, neither can God.
This is also, I think, either contentious or confused. A theist might consider God *brutely necessary*. Depending on the construal of the PSR in question, one might think only contingent facts require explanations. In which case, God's brute necessity is on the table, particularly if one denies the conceivability argument outlined above. In any case, it's not clear from the definition given why a 'truly omnipotent' (I take this to just mean 'omnipotent') being couldn't be a 'subject'. In fact, I think theists are committed to thinking God is a subject! He's an agent! Now, presumably you mean 'subject to laws' or 'constrained in some way' but the theist who takes God's omnipotence to be something like "ability to bring about any logically possible state of affairs" surely isn't going to be subject (pun intended) to such an entailment.
Okay, as I said, more to say here but I wanted to restrict my comments to one section. Despite my criticisms I think this is an interesting argument!
Thanks for the review and feel free to explode away! I'll address your points in turn
>I think this is at least partly confused. Most theists take God's necessity to be an entailment of his defining property (say, maximal perfection just so we have something to work with). These sorts of claims can be understood conditionally (i.e. if God exists, he exists necessarily) which is precisely what motivates modal flavors of ontological arguments. This sort of reply isn't saying that God exists necessarily, it's saying that a contingent being *can't be God*.
Stating that God is necessary is begging the question (on the question of his existence). You have to either (1) prove god is necessary or (2) accept God as contingent (in which case the argument would apply)
>This assumes conceivability implies possibility, which I think is straightforwardly false, and can plausibly rejected by theists.
I agree and have criticized this point as well. But here, this is an argument against (1) above. I can't imagine 1+1 equalling anything other than 2, or a bachelor being married, as these are necessary truths. But I *can* imagine a universe without a God, suggesting God isn't necessary.
>This is also, I think, either contentious or confused. A theist might consider God *brutely necessary*. Depending on the construal of the PSR in question, one might think only contingent facts require explanations. In which case, God's brute necessity is on the table, particularly if one denies the conceivability argument outlined above. In any case, it's not clear from the definition given why a 'truly omnipotent' (I take this to just mean 'omnipotent') being couldn't be a 'subject'. In fact, I think theists are committed to thinking God is a subject! He's an agent! Now, presumably you mean 'subject to laws' or 'constrained in some way' but the theist who takes God's omnipotence to be something like "ability to bring about any logically possible state of affairs" surely isn't going to be subject (pun intended) to such an entailment.
This is also just asserting God. "brute necessity" is also a contradiction (necessary from what?). You either have to show (1) above (prove God's necessity), or accept (2), in which case this article shows that God can't be omnipotent.
> Stating that God is necessary is begging the question (on the question of his existence). You have to either (1) prove god is necessary or (2) accept God as contingent (in which case the argument would apply)
Yea, what I'm saying is that when theists say "God is necessary" they typically mean God is by definition necessary i.e. If God exists he exists necessarily. Whether *that* is true is just a matter of definition. Whether he, in fact, exists necessarily obviously comes right after. I'm not sympathetic to those arguments, but some theists might be.
> I agree and have criticized this point as well. But here, this is an argument against (1) above. I can't imagine 1+1 equalling anything other than 2, or a bachelor being married, as these are necessary truths. But I *can* imagine a universe without a God, suggesting God isn't necessary.
Maybe I'm not understanding you, but is the argument here supposed to be contra conceivability implies possibility? Because I don't see how it moves the needle, I agree if someone agrees to C implies P that being able to conceive of a godless world would entail he couldn't be necessary. I just think theists should reject C implies P.
> This is also just asserting God. "brute necessity" is also a contradiction (necessary from what?).
As above, I take this move to just be hashing out terms, then the theist can provide evidence of his necessity. Also brute necessity wouldn't be a contradiction, unless we have different understandings of bruteness and necessity. I take bruteness to mean an absence of an explanation, and necessity to mean existing in all possible worlds. If something is brutely necessary, then the fact that it exists necessarily is unexplained. I don't see a contradiction on that understanding.
> You either have to show (1) above (prove God's necessity), or accept (2), in which case this article shows that God can't be omnipotent.
Roughly just reiterating what I said above. Whether God is a necessary being is a distinct question from whether he *in fact* exists necessarily. If the theist understands God to be a necessary being as a matter of definition, you're just talking past them if the entity at hand is contingent.
>Yea, what I'm saying is that when theists say "God is necessary" they typically mean God is by definition necessary i.e. If God exists he exists necessarily. Whether *that* is true is just a matter of definition. Whether he, in fact, exists necessarily obviously comes right after. I'm not sympathetic to those arguments, but some theists might be.
I agree. This is the problem with the ontological argument. If God exists he *has* to exist. And if he doesn't exist he *can't* exist. The ontological argument is high stakes. He either does or does not exist necessarily. This argument shows how he cannot exist necessarily, while theists have failed to provide an argument for why he necessarily does exist (in which case, where is he?).
Sorry now I worry I'm confused. I took the appeal to C implies P to be your argument against God being able to exist necessarily. I was then saying that I think the theist can very reasonably reject C implies P. You say "God is not necessary because it is conceivable that a world could exist without Him." but this only acts as a counter example if you accept that C implies P (of course because, the idea with this is that if you can conceive of God's non existence, his non-existence is possible, therefore he isn't necessary. But that only works with C implies P).
Correct me if I’m wrong, but this is meant to be an internal critique, so my understanding is that you’re making the critique from within the omni-theist’s own framework to show an internal contradiction. I just wanted to say that I know written comments can sometimes come across as more intense or hostile than intended, so I hope it’s clear that I’m just sharing my perspective in good faith (pun intended).
When you say God has a nature He cannot change, at least under classical theism, change requires potentiality because it involves a transition from one state to another, and potentiality implies imperfection since it indicates dependence, incompleteness or unfulfilled capacity. So that’s why what you describe as a flaw (God’s immutability) is actually an essential feature of His perfect, independent and complete nature.
God’s immutability doesn’t entail that He’s restricted by logic, as I'll try to explain. Logic is just the reflection in the created order of God’s rational nature, including His logical mind. It’s not that the principles of logic restrain God, but that what it means to be perfect is to never have the ability to be imperfect. Acting illogically or irrationally would be imperfect. Nor is it the case that something’s logical or rational merely because God does it, or that God acts because something’s logical or rational. Instead, God’s will and actions are perfectly aligned with the source or grounding of all logic and rationality, which is His nature. So what we think of as logic and rationality are our creaturely understanding of God’s nature.
For example, the principle of non-contradiction is grounded in the absolutely simple nature of God. Because God’s nature is simple and unified, it can’t contain contradictions, since contradictions in God’s nature would imply composition or division, both of which are contrary to His simple and unified nature.
Regarding P1 in your syllogism, by ‘Reason,’ do you mean the PSR, the mental faculty of reason, or something else? I’d agree the PSR is a necessary or eternal truth because it’s a principle rooted in God’s rational and intelligible nature, which is the source of all order and coherence in creation. The PSR reflects the idea that God acts for reasons that are consistent with His nature.
For P2, if C1 is meant to be a reductio ad absurdum, I don’t think most theists would say the PSR, necessary or eternal truths or the mental faculty of reason exists independently of God. If by ‘reason,’ you mean the principles of reason like the axioms of rational thought, then I don’t think theists would accept that either. So if this is meant as an internal critique, I don’t think it would describe most theists.
For P6, if this is an internal critique, I don’t think most theistic would agree the ability to change the PSR or any necessary or eternal truths is a power. As I understand it, a power is a capacity to bring about a specific effect, and something that’s impossible lacks any capacity. Necessary truths lack the capacity for change because they’re rooted in God’s immutable nature.
I hope my perspective makes sense, and I’m always open to further discussion or clarification if anything I’ve said isn’t clear.
Thank you for your thoughtful and respectful response. I have addressed each of your points. This article relates closely to the article on omnipotence I have made previously, so not all the points have been carried over. Let me know if you have any thoughts on the below.
>>When you say God has a nature He cannot change, at least under classical theism, change requires potentiality because it involves a transition from one state to another, and potentiality implies imperfection since it indicates dependence, incompleteness or unfulfilled capacity. So that’s why what you describe as a flaw (God’s immutability) is actually an essential feature of His perfect, independent and complete nature.
The article isn't about whether God himself can change, but whether he can truly *create* change. Yet because change is governed and explained by logical causation under the PSR, there is no room for an omnipotent God to create change, as he cannot alter this logical structure.
>>God’s immutability doesn’t entail that He’s restricted by logic, as I'll try to explain. Logic is just the reflection in the created order of God’s rational nature, including His logical mind. It’s not that the principles of logic restrain God, but that what it means to be perfect is to never have the ability to be imperfect. Acting illogically or irrationally would be imperfect. Nor is it the case that something’s logical or rational merely because God does it, or that God acts because something’s logical or rational. Instead, God’s will and actions are perfectly aligned with the source or grounding of all logic and rationality, which is His nature. So what we think of as logic and rationality are our creaturely understanding of God’s nature.
I disagree that logic is the reflection of God's nature. 1=1 is true regardless of God's power or creation. We can imagine 2 universes. One where God does exist and one where he doesn't. 1=1 would be necessarily true in both, entirely independent of God's will in the "God exists" universe. Moreover, if you say that God has a nature, then you accept that he is still bound by logic. An omnipotent being isn't bound by anything. Logic is the ultimate governor either way.
>>For example, the principle of non-contradiction is grounded in the absolutely simple nature of God. Because God’s nature is simple and unified, it can’t contain contradictions, since contradictions in God’s nature would imply composition or division, both of which are contrary to His simple and unified nature.
I disagree, the PNC is axiomatic and self-evident. 1 cannot equal 2, whether or not God wills it. If you say God can't will otherwise because of his nature, then you don't have omnipotence, as a truly omnipotent being wouldn't be restricted by such a nature.
>>Regarding P1 in your syllogism, by ‘Reason,’ do you mean the PSR, the mental faculty of reason, or something else? I’d agree the PSR is a necessary or eternal truth because it’s a principle rooted in God’s rational and intelligible nature, which is the source of all order and coherence in creation. The PSR reflects the idea that God acts for reasons that are consistent with His nature.
I described "Reason" is more detail in prior articles, but its not a mental capacity, it is objective, abstract and platonic. For our purposes, we can understand "Reason" as the laws of thought (LI, LNC, LEM). These laws are necessarily true in all possible worlds. (maybe I'll edit reason to logic for this purpose).
>>For P2, if C1 is meant to be a reductio ad absurdum, I don’t think most theists would say the PSR, necessary or eternal truths or the mental faculty of reason exists independently of God. If by ‘reason,’ you mean the principles of reason like the axioms of rational thought, then I don’t think theists would accept that either. So if this is meant as an internal critique, I don’t think it would describe most theists.
C1 isn't the heart of my argument, which is instead C3 and C4. From what I understand most theists accept C1, but try to separate God's inability to change necessary truths from his ability to change contingent truths. As the rest of the argument shows, these truths are not separate (at least not under the PSR), as contingent truths supervene on necessary truths. You can't truly change contingent truths without also changing necessary truths.
>>For P6, if this is an internal critique, I don’t think most theistic would agree the ability to change the PSR or any necessary or eternal truths is a power. As I understand it, a power is a capacity to bring about a specific effect, and something that’s impossible lacks any capacity. Necessary truths lack the capacity for change because they’re rooted in God’s immutable nature.
Yes, something that is impossible necessarily lacks capacity, and not even God can give it capacity, limiting his "omnipotence" (which by definition, can't be limited). If God can't give it capacity due to an "immutable" nature, then he is a slave to his nature (also not omnipotent).
Rather than focusing on where we disagree, it might be more constructive in this case to concentrate on where we agree. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I thought you seemed to agree with the following premises. If so, then the conclusion naturally follows.
If something is a power, then it has the capacity to bring about a specific effect. (If P, then Q)
Impossible things lack the capacity to bring about specific effects. (¬Q)
Therefore, impossible things are not powers. (¬P modus tollens)
Apply this to contradictions, then the syllogism goes as follows:
If something is a power, then it has the capacity to bring about a specific effect.
(If P, then Q)
The ability to make contradictions real lacks the capacity to bring about a specific effect (since contradictions cannot be realized).
(¬Q)
Therefore, the ability to make contradictions real is not a power.
(¬P modus tollens)
But my understanding of your rebuttal was that the inability to give capacity to impossible things or make them possible is a limitation of God’s omnipotence. I think I can explain why it's a mistaken inference to think that being unable to bring about a specific effect is necessarily a limitation of an ability.
For example, an omni-being is unable to be ignorant or evil. But omniscience or omnibenevolence are not limited by being unable to be ignorant or evil. That is because ignorance and evil are privations (or absences of something that ought to be present). Privations do not have a positive ontological status and are non-being. Ignorance and evil are instead the absence of knowledge and goodness. I’m not denying that evil has negative effects, but evil is rightly understood as the absence of something that is due (namely, goodness.) Likewise, contradictions are also non-being. They are the absence of logical coherence. For the same reason that being unable to be evil is not a limitation of omnibenevolence (because goodness is a privation, not an object of knowledge), being unable to perform a contradiction or make them possible is not a limitation of omnipotence (because contradictions are a privation, not an object of power).
>>If something is a power, then it has the capacity to bring about a specific effect. (If P, then Q)
>>Impossible things lack the capacity to bring about specific effects. (¬Q)
>>Therefore, impossible things are not powers. (¬P modus tollens)
P1 is already assuming that powers are only things that are "possible" to do. As discussed in (A4) and (A7), this is misguided and arbitrary. "Power" is the ability to bring about effects. If a certain "power" is impossible to have, then true omnipotence is already off the table, as some powers are impossible. Just because a power would be impossible to have doesn't mean that it's not a power, it just means that true omnipotence is nonsense. If something is impossible, the concept isn't revised to make it possible, the burden is still on the person who claims to do the impossible. In fact, doing the impossible would be the only true power that can make God "God."
Otherwise, this is to create a tautology. If powers are things that are only possible to do, then "power" becomes meaningless. It's impossible for me to jump to the moon (as given my physical state, such an inability would not be nonsensical). Therefore, me jumping to the moon is not a power, (I lack the capacity to bring about that effect due to the laws of physics) for how can my physical state possibly do that.
>>For example, an omni-being is unable to be ignorant or evil. But omniscience or omnibenevolence are not limited by being unable to be ignorant or evil. That is because ignorance and evil are privations (or absences of something that ought to be present).
This is an arbitrary asymmetry between good and evil. Clearly, a person capable of committing evil has broader abilities (or power), than someone restricted by morality. They would have more options at their disposal to produce effects. Its warping already clear meanings to produce an asymmetry to say that someone not restricted by morality somehow has less powers than someone who is, when its clear they have more. Any form of restrictions (including morality) serve as limits to power, which is antithetical to true omnipotence.
Thank you for your response. Your moon-jumping parody made a good point that physically impossible things are still examples of power, so I'll try refining the argument using power as you defined it.
1. If and only if something does not have the ability to bring about effects, then it is not a form or example of power. (¬P ↔ ¬Q)
2. Whatever is logically impossible does not have the ability to bring about effects. (¬P)
3. Therefore, whatever is logically impossible is not a form or example of power. (¬Q modus ponens)
P1 is the biconditional inference of the necessary and sufficient conditions of power, per your definition. It's not assuming that a power is only something that is logically possible because it does not directly state or presuppose the conclusion but rather provides your general definition of power. A presupposing premise would have said "possible ability" or "possible effects." If the definition were changed to include "possible ability" or "possible effects," then the definition itself would be assuming that impossible things are not powers, which your moon-jumping parody pointed out is incorrect since physically impossible things for one thing could be physically possible for another.
For P2, I assumed you would agree since your argument included the premise that real contradictions don't exist, which would entail they can't bring about effects.
What do you think of P1 and P2?
Thanks again for the conversation. Unless you have any questions for me, I think I’ll wrap up my comments here.
I would not agree with any of those premises, as this is the definition of omnipotence you had adopted which I had said was meaningless, but I do agree with your conclusion. Once you accept the PSR, then you accept a logical structure to the universe, where bringing about any self-willed uncaused effect would be impossible and there would be no such thing as "power" (this is just the determinist agreement applied to power rather than free will). Under that definition, no one would have any power and God could never be omnipotent. Under any definition you use for omnipotence/power, you can't get an omnipotent God.
My only question is, given a logically structured universe governed by universally true axioms, and that no power can break free from this logical structure, how can omnipotence even be possible? Isn't God logically impossible and necessarily false in all possible worlds?