You see a butterfly, it looks tired, maybe dying. In a flash of insight you know that a small child will come to the park soon who will currently grow up to be NeoHitler. However, if, he sees a butterfly that will restore his wonder in yada yada yada and he will instead grow up to do [something very sympathetic]. You know that if you don't place the butterfly on a flower, where it will be able to sup the nectar and revive itself, this kid will become NeoHitler.
Even though all of the effects of your actions are mediated through this kids own choices, you're still an appalling person if you don't place the butterfly on the flower, and if such miraculous flashes of insight were common and known about, it would be appropriate for the legal system to sanction people who don't take appropriate steps to avert disasters like this.
NeoHitler can't say "the atrocities weren't my fault, because that day I didn't see a butterfly." NeoHitler is a free agent and is responsible for NeoHitler's choices. You don't become the moral equivalent of NeoHitler even with this supernatural knowledge.
This is hard for me to comment on as my intuitions about blame aren't super clear. Blame is a tricky issue for me, it doesn't really exist in my moral ontology except as a convenient social tool- or maybe it does exist but in a complex mediated way, as a component of eudaimonia in the form of (moral) flourishing and non-flourishing. My personal moral views are very close to the eudaimonic utilitarianism I alluded to in the other thread.
However, to the extent that blame does exist in my moral ontology, I'm willing to concede that our hypothetical character is not *as bad* as NeoHitler, but it still seems like they are very bad, and I'm willing to bet that 80%+ of the population would agree with me. I strongly suspect that if this sort of stuff happened often, a majority of the population would support sanctions for people who don't make such interventions, at least when they are relatively easy. So if intuitions have any moral weight, that seems like a problem for your theory. I'm curious as to what you'd say about that.
I address your concern somewhat in another article linked below, but I'll summarize (using an example from Scanlon). Say you a developer who is about to construct a new building. Yet despite your strict obedience to all the safety codes, 10 workers die every time you construct a building. People are willing to work for you (10 is still lower than elsewhere) but despite your best efforts, 10 people get killed on every one of your construction projects.
Are you now responsible for future deaths resulting from future construction, given your knowledge? Or is there a point where your responsibilities end and others begin?
I argue that a duty to rescue would be included in the social contract (given that it does not violate other rules, so the trolley problem would not apply). Yet people would not want their moral responsibility to end out into infinity, even with knowledge. They would recognzie that the butterfly killer is not NeoHitler, although in the case you presented, he may have accomplice liability or at least is violating his duty to rescue.
Yet if he had any sort of reason to kill the butterfly, and then reported his knowledge to the relevant authorities, then I'd say his duties would be satisfied. NeoHitler's rise could then only be caused by the irresponsbility of others, and they couldn't pass off their blame to the butterfly killer.
> But is the proximate cause just an instance of the law being practical instead of moral? No, our legal rules must rely on moral principles for them to be more than arbitrary commands.
This is the legal system we are talking about. It isn't some source of moral principles. It is full of arbitrary commands. At best it is a collection of kludges that usually work well. More often it is whatever politicians thought would appeal to the median voter.
In this case, evil geniuses pulling xantos gambits are rare. Random stuff happening is more common. Therefore, if your actions cause someone to die through an incredibly elaborate series of events, chances are you are just a random Joe, the events aren't something you predicted. Punishment only works to deter people from actions when they can predict that an action will lead to punishment. There is no point punishing people for consequences they could not possibly predict.
Likewise with the corn dealer example, if there is a baying mob outside the corn dealers house, it is pretty clear to the average person why saying such things might be bad. With greater distance, the actual chance of causing violence falls, and the predictability of consequences falls more. Maybe your speech inspires a new tax on corn dealers, such discussion helps democracy work.
All your examples look like "the direct method and the indirect method lead to the same results, but are morally different". And I think those moral principles you refer to differentiate the direct and indirect precisely because the results are not the same.
The law only has authority to the extent that its moral, so it’s a useful guide. And people would assign different moral blame to a but-for cause of a harm vs a proximate cause.
In Mill’s example, if the article on corn laws and the speech on corn laws produced the same outcome (either causing harm or not causing harm to the corn dealer) there is different moral culpability between the author and the speaker. And proximity to the mob and the dealer factors into this culpability.
Much of the reason people follow the law is because of police. Sure, massive blatantly wrong decisions can spark protests. But it has to be really blatantly wrong for that.
We are querying our intuition for "culpability". And we are assuming the same consequences, and the same knowledge of consequences in the hypothetical. Intuition is shaped by our model of reality, and this is hard to turn off. So our intuition assigns less culpability. But that could just be because our intuition thinks the more indirect action is less likely to result in harm.
I'll be making the case that legal authority derives from ethical principles, which derive from reason, not expressions of power. And I discuss the legitimacy of different types of legal regimes here:
And sure, our intuitions are guided by the risk of harm. But they are also guided by the freedom of the individual. For example, if South Park were to air an episode showing the prophet muhammad, which they knew would create a risk of a terrorist attack, they would not be morally culpable for that risk. The responsibility lies with the actual terrorists and the free well-intentioned expression of the individual is respected. If a terrorist attack were to happen, South Park would be a but-for cause, not a proximate cause.
We can compare the laws produced by a well functioning democracy to morality. And indeed find that they often resemble each other.
You can argue there is an extra moral reason to follow the laws such a democracy makes, even when the laws are not morality. Like suppose the government randomly decided to ban bright pink hats. If you go around wearing a bright pink hat, the government will arrest and imprison you. Therefore don't do that. Even though the law is totally arbitrary. If the law was both arbitrary, and utterly unenforced. Someone had written a law against pink hats on the law books, but people regularly wore pink hats, and no one was ever punished for doing so. Then I would say, there is no moral duty to follow that law.
Putting bans on any work that might encourage someone to do something bad would greatly stifle art. And it kind of gives people planning to do wrong a "blame any author you like, and take them down with you" card. And, in the case of the Islamic extremists, it is at least plausible they are planning to commit an act of terrorism somewhere, and depicting Mohamed just chooses where. The law, (and most authors) don't have a detailed enough mental model of what the terrorists are thinking.
Suppose the law did follow proximate causes. I stand up and say "if Joe Bloggs doesn't give me all his money, I will kill someone. (not anyone Joe knows, just some random stranger)" If Joe doesn't give me his money and I follow through, the law punishes both of us. This means that the law itself is being used for blackmail. I would never have made such threats if the law was not like that.
You see a butterfly, it looks tired, maybe dying. In a flash of insight you know that a small child will come to the park soon who will currently grow up to be NeoHitler. However, if, he sees a butterfly that will restore his wonder in yada yada yada and he will instead grow up to do [something very sympathetic]. You know that if you don't place the butterfly on a flower, where it will be able to sup the nectar and revive itself, this kid will become NeoHitler.
Even though all of the effects of your actions are mediated through this kids own choices, you're still an appalling person if you don't place the butterfly on the flower, and if such miraculous flashes of insight were common and known about, it would be appropriate for the legal system to sanction people who don't take appropriate steps to avert disasters like this.
NeoHitler can't say "the atrocities weren't my fault, because that day I didn't see a butterfly." NeoHitler is a free agent and is responsible for NeoHitler's choices. You don't become the moral equivalent of NeoHitler even with this supernatural knowledge.
This is hard for me to comment on as my intuitions about blame aren't super clear. Blame is a tricky issue for me, it doesn't really exist in my moral ontology except as a convenient social tool- or maybe it does exist but in a complex mediated way, as a component of eudaimonia in the form of (moral) flourishing and non-flourishing. My personal moral views are very close to the eudaimonic utilitarianism I alluded to in the other thread.
However, to the extent that blame does exist in my moral ontology, I'm willing to concede that our hypothetical character is not *as bad* as NeoHitler, but it still seems like they are very bad, and I'm willing to bet that 80%+ of the population would agree with me. I strongly suspect that if this sort of stuff happened often, a majority of the population would support sanctions for people who don't make such interventions, at least when they are relatively easy. So if intuitions have any moral weight, that seems like a problem for your theory. I'm curious as to what you'd say about that.
I address your concern somewhat in another article linked below, but I'll summarize (using an example from Scanlon). Say you a developer who is about to construct a new building. Yet despite your strict obedience to all the safety codes, 10 workers die every time you construct a building. People are willing to work for you (10 is still lower than elsewhere) but despite your best efforts, 10 people get killed on every one of your construction projects.
Are you now responsible for future deaths resulting from future construction, given your knowledge? Or is there a point where your responsibilities end and others begin?
https://garik.substack.com/p/the-trolley-problem-is-not-a-moral
I argue that a duty to rescue would be included in the social contract (given that it does not violate other rules, so the trolley problem would not apply). Yet people would not want their moral responsibility to end out into infinity, even with knowledge. They would recognzie that the butterfly killer is not NeoHitler, although in the case you presented, he may have accomplice liability or at least is violating his duty to rescue.
Yet if he had any sort of reason to kill the butterfly, and then reported his knowledge to the relevant authorities, then I'd say his duties would be satisfied. NeoHitler's rise could then only be caused by the irresponsbility of others, and they couldn't pass off their blame to the butterfly killer.
> But is the proximate cause just an instance of the law being practical instead of moral? No, our legal rules must rely on moral principles for them to be more than arbitrary commands.
This is the legal system we are talking about. It isn't some source of moral principles. It is full of arbitrary commands. At best it is a collection of kludges that usually work well. More often it is whatever politicians thought would appeal to the median voter.
In this case, evil geniuses pulling xantos gambits are rare. Random stuff happening is more common. Therefore, if your actions cause someone to die through an incredibly elaborate series of events, chances are you are just a random Joe, the events aren't something you predicted. Punishment only works to deter people from actions when they can predict that an action will lead to punishment. There is no point punishing people for consequences they could not possibly predict.
Likewise with the corn dealer example, if there is a baying mob outside the corn dealers house, it is pretty clear to the average person why saying such things might be bad. With greater distance, the actual chance of causing violence falls, and the predictability of consequences falls more. Maybe your speech inspires a new tax on corn dealers, such discussion helps democracy work.
All your examples look like "the direct method and the indirect method lead to the same results, but are morally different". And I think those moral principles you refer to differentiate the direct and indirect precisely because the results are not the same.
The law only has authority to the extent that its moral, so it’s a useful guide. And people would assign different moral blame to a but-for cause of a harm vs a proximate cause.
In Mill’s example, if the article on corn laws and the speech on corn laws produced the same outcome (either causing harm or not causing harm to the corn dealer) there is different moral culpability between the author and the speaker. And proximity to the mob and the dealer factors into this culpability.
Much of the reason people follow the law is because of police. Sure, massive blatantly wrong decisions can spark protests. But it has to be really blatantly wrong for that.
We are querying our intuition for "culpability". And we are assuming the same consequences, and the same knowledge of consequences in the hypothetical. Intuition is shaped by our model of reality, and this is hard to turn off. So our intuition assigns less culpability. But that could just be because our intuition thinks the more indirect action is less likely to result in harm.
I'll be making the case that legal authority derives from ethical principles, which derive from reason, not expressions of power. And I discuss the legitimacy of different types of legal regimes here:
https://garik.substack.com/p/laws-must-be-moral-reviewing-three
I'll be writing more on this in later posts.
And sure, our intuitions are guided by the risk of harm. But they are also guided by the freedom of the individual. For example, if South Park were to air an episode showing the prophet muhammad, which they knew would create a risk of a terrorist attack, they would not be morally culpable for that risk. The responsibility lies with the actual terrorists and the free well-intentioned expression of the individual is respected. If a terrorist attack were to happen, South Park would be a but-for cause, not a proximate cause.
We can compare the laws produced by a well functioning democracy to morality. And indeed find that they often resemble each other.
You can argue there is an extra moral reason to follow the laws such a democracy makes, even when the laws are not morality. Like suppose the government randomly decided to ban bright pink hats. If you go around wearing a bright pink hat, the government will arrest and imprison you. Therefore don't do that. Even though the law is totally arbitrary. If the law was both arbitrary, and utterly unenforced. Someone had written a law against pink hats on the law books, but people regularly wore pink hats, and no one was ever punished for doing so. Then I would say, there is no moral duty to follow that law.
Putting bans on any work that might encourage someone to do something bad would greatly stifle art. And it kind of gives people planning to do wrong a "blame any author you like, and take them down with you" card. And, in the case of the Islamic extremists, it is at least plausible they are planning to commit an act of terrorism somewhere, and depicting Mohamed just chooses where. The law, (and most authors) don't have a detailed enough mental model of what the terrorists are thinking.
Suppose the law did follow proximate causes. I stand up and say "if Joe Bloggs doesn't give me all his money, I will kill someone. (not anyone Joe knows, just some random stranger)" If Joe doesn't give me his money and I follow through, the law punishes both of us. This means that the law itself is being used for blackmail. I would never have made such threats if the law was not like that.