You are only looking for examples that support your theory, you should be looking for examples that falsify your theory. A rational person doesn't look for many white swans, he looks for a single black swan.
If you feel the Earth is flat, does it mean it's flat? No. That alone falsifies your theory.
There's plenty more examples. If you feel an image is moving, is it moving? No, optical *illusions* are as the name implies: not real.
Whatever your brain thinks is happening, is not actually happening.
Yes, the feeling of free will exists, but reality doesn't care about feelings, either what you feel exists, or it doesn't. And you accepted it doesn't. That's pretty much the definition of an illusion: something that appears real, but it's not.
Therefore free will is not real, it's an illusion.
The shape of the earth or a picture are things that exists as a feature of the world, not as an experience.
Free will is something that exists as an experience. The same goes for color, sound, and pain. (I argue everything exists as experience, but we can stick to secondary qualities).
Imagine if someone said, there is no such thing as red. That red is only our perception of light and what we call red is an illusion. The statement wouldn’t provide any real information, and instead would say more about what we mean about “illusion” than “red.”
The might be right that there is no red we can point to in the world, but it undoubtedly exists as an experience. The same with free will.
That’s a bit like saying “the feeling of taste exists as an experience” but since there is no objective taste, then taste is illusory.
It’s a conceptual issue that I’ll write about in another article. Because free will is by definition without cause, whereas secondary qualities are caused, we have a hard time viewing it properly as an experience. Yet viewing free will as an objective thing in the word is the wrong way to look at it. The way that free will matters morally is the same way taste, smell, and sound matter. They matter as experience.
That's a false equivalence fallacy. You are comparing an apple with oranges, instead of comparing it with apples.
Taste is an orange. We all agree that taste is an orange, therefore it makes sense to compare taste with other oranges.
Free will is not an orange. We all agree that it's not an orange, therefore it does *not* make sense to compare free will with oranges.
Your argument boils down to: oranges don't have to exist in objective reality, therefore free will doesn't have to exist in objective reality, just like taste... Yeah, *if* it was an orange, which it's not.
You can't redefine free will to mean something nobody agrees with.
“Did you feel free” is all anyone cares about in morality. Strikes from conscious movements are morally different than those from unconscious reflexes. Both are determined, but one feels free in one case and doesn’t feel free in the other. Yes it’s an orange. Otherwise, you’re just denying the conscious experience of free will, which is undeniable.
You are only looking for examples that support your theory, you should be looking for examples that falsify your theory. A rational person doesn't look for many white swans, he looks for a single black swan.
If you feel the Earth is flat, does it mean it's flat? No. That alone falsifies your theory.
There's plenty more examples. If you feel an image is moving, is it moving? No, optical *illusions* are as the name implies: not real.
Whatever your brain thinks is happening, is not actually happening.
Yes, the feeling of free will exists, but reality doesn't care about feelings, either what you feel exists, or it doesn't. And you accepted it doesn't. That's pretty much the definition of an illusion: something that appears real, but it's not.
Therefore free will is not real, it's an illusion.
The shape of the earth or a picture are things that exists as a feature of the world, not as an experience.
Free will is something that exists as an experience. The same goes for color, sound, and pain. (I argue everything exists as experience, but we can stick to secondary qualities).
Imagine if someone said, there is no such thing as red. That red is only our perception of light and what we call red is an illusion. The statement wouldn’t provide any real information, and instead would say more about what we mean about “illusion” than “red.”
The might be right that there is no red we can point to in the world, but it undoubtedly exists as an experience. The same with free will.
> Free will is something that exists as an experience.
No, it isn't. The feeling of free will is an experience. Free will itself is not.
If it was, there never would have been any debate about it.
That’s a bit like saying “the feeling of taste exists as an experience” but since there is no objective taste, then taste is illusory.
It’s a conceptual issue that I’ll write about in another article. Because free will is by definition without cause, whereas secondary qualities are caused, we have a hard time viewing it properly as an experience. Yet viewing free will as an objective thing in the word is the wrong way to look at it. The way that free will matters morally is the same way taste, smell, and sound matter. They matter as experience.
That's a false equivalence fallacy. You are comparing an apple with oranges, instead of comparing it with apples.
Taste is an orange. We all agree that taste is an orange, therefore it makes sense to compare taste with other oranges.
Free will is not an orange. We all agree that it's not an orange, therefore it does *not* make sense to compare free will with oranges.
Your argument boils down to: oranges don't have to exist in objective reality, therefore free will doesn't have to exist in objective reality, just like taste... Yeah, *if* it was an orange, which it's not.
You can't redefine free will to mean something nobody agrees with.
“Did you feel free” is all anyone cares about in morality. Strikes from conscious movements are morally different than those from unconscious reflexes. Both are determined, but one feels free in one case and doesn’t feel free in the other. Yes it’s an orange. Otherwise, you’re just denying the conscious experience of free will, which is undeniable.
Which is why free will is irrelevant for morality. What you are talking about is volition, not free will.
Nobody denies that volition exists. Not so with regards to free will. You are just muddying the waters by talking about it.
Why not talk in terms that everyone agrees with?