“First, a belief would be considered “justified” if it has publicly available and acceptable reasons which would warrant that belief. (J).”
Is “warrant” a distinct concept or just another word for justify? Do we have objective criteria for determining the acceptability of reasons?
“Second, that belief must actually reflect an objective state of the world. No matter how reasonable or well-informed a belief is, you wouldn’t have knowledge unless that belief were true. (T).”
This demands an impossible godlike perspective. This means I can know something that isn’t knowledge. Well, I don’t really know it, I just think I do. That seems like a problem.
Popper thought all knowledge was conjectural. That seems pretty extreme. I’m pretty sure I know 1+1=2 in a way that makes it more than a conjecture.
He also thought that justification doesn’t work. My perhaps bad summary of his argument is, the best we can do is logical deduction, and at best that always proves a hypothetical: if the premises are true and the argument is valid, the conclusion is also true. We can't know that the premises are true, without another argument. So if we have justified anything, it is the entire hypothetical, never the conclusion on its own. And since philosophers are constantly criticizing arguments in new ways, finding new twists and informal fallacies, even the hypothetical may not be fully justified.
This is not really a serious response to your post, just a knee-jerk reaction. Sorry.
Thanks for reviewing! By "warrant" I mean an explanation which would reasonably imply that belief, subject to rules of public reason (so you can explain it to others).
And knowledge does presuppose "truth," which does require a godlike perspective as you mentioned. However, the contextualist argument I provide explains why I believe we can still have knowledge in one social sense, although we couldn't in another ultimate sense. So I don't believe Popper's view, where "no" belief would be justified, is warranted.
How is “an explanation which would reasonably imply that belief, subject to rules of public reason (so you can explain it to others)” distinct from justification? Justification includes warrant, or they intersect, or they are identical? Justification is a process, warrant is just a fact?
They're not distinct, the above definition is only a type of justification. We could have private justifications (gut feelings) or process-based justifications (which wouldn't require justifications). But I argue that knowledge is correct understanding, where the knower would be able to provide an explanation for how evidence for a truth relates to that truth. Its not just having evidence, but also knowing how that evidence relates.
Children likely do, if they are capable of answering "why" to their beliefs. Babies and animals likely don't (they may not even have concepts to create beliefs).
In many cases, if we asked a child to explain one of their beliefs, they would say something like “Mom told me” or “I learned it in school.” That doesn’t seem like an explanation for how evidence for a truth relates to that truth.
“First, a belief would be considered “justified” if it has publicly available and acceptable reasons which would warrant that belief. (J).”
Is “warrant” a distinct concept or just another word for justify? Do we have objective criteria for determining the acceptability of reasons?
“Second, that belief must actually reflect an objective state of the world. No matter how reasonable or well-informed a belief is, you wouldn’t have knowledge unless that belief were true. (T).”
This demands an impossible godlike perspective. This means I can know something that isn’t knowledge. Well, I don’t really know it, I just think I do. That seems like a problem.
Popper thought all knowledge was conjectural. That seems pretty extreme. I’m pretty sure I know 1+1=2 in a way that makes it more than a conjecture.
He also thought that justification doesn’t work. My perhaps bad summary of his argument is, the best we can do is logical deduction, and at best that always proves a hypothetical: if the premises are true and the argument is valid, the conclusion is also true. We can't know that the premises are true, without another argument. So if we have justified anything, it is the entire hypothetical, never the conclusion on its own. And since philosophers are constantly criticizing arguments in new ways, finding new twists and informal fallacies, even the hypothetical may not be fully justified.
This is not really a serious response to your post, just a knee-jerk reaction. Sorry.
Thanks for reviewing! By "warrant" I mean an explanation which would reasonably imply that belief, subject to rules of public reason (so you can explain it to others).
And knowledge does presuppose "truth," which does require a godlike perspective as you mentioned. However, the contextualist argument I provide explains why I believe we can still have knowledge in one social sense, although we couldn't in another ultimate sense. So I don't believe Popper's view, where "no" belief would be justified, is warranted.
How is “an explanation which would reasonably imply that belief, subject to rules of public reason (so you can explain it to others)” distinct from justification? Justification includes warrant, or they intersect, or they are identical? Justification is a process, warrant is just a fact?
They're not distinct, the above definition is only a type of justification. We could have private justifications (gut feelings) or process-based justifications (which wouldn't require justifications). But I argue that knowledge is correct understanding, where the knower would be able to provide an explanation for how evidence for a truth relates to that truth. Its not just having evidence, but also knowing how that evidence relates.
So children do not know anything?
Children likely do, if they are capable of answering "why" to their beliefs. Babies and animals likely don't (they may not even have concepts to create beliefs).
In many cases, if we asked a child to explain one of their beliefs, they would say something like “Mom told me” or “I learned it in school.” That doesn’t seem like an explanation for how evidence for a truth relates to that truth.