UPDATE: unfortunately, you have fallen for the same confusion as the other proponents of your theory. You’re confusing the input of algorithm with the algorithm itself. The context affects the INPUT of the algorithm, without affecting the ALGORITHM itself. However, you haven’t gave much detail beyond “the output depends on the input.”. The problem is that there is cluelessness about the algorithm itself IN ADDITION to cluelessness about its inputs. The connectedness requirement looks less like an independent vindication of our epistemic intuitions about particular cases, and looks more like an attempt (successful or otherwise) to reverse engineer a general principle to accommodate our epistemic intuitions about particular cases. As a result, I would NOT be surprised if justified true belief really is sufficient for knowledge, despite of all our ( and Edmund Gettier’s) epistemic intuitions about particular cases to the contrary. As a result, I want to suspend judgment (at least temporarily) about which theory of knowledge is true.
Different fields (mathematics, history, science, english, etc.) have different standards for what qualifies as knowledge. You can create different algorithms for these various fields, but the abstract definition of "knowledge" is JBCT. Although the more facts you are able to provide, the more specific the standard can be (as is the case with language generally). Yet the core of what "knowledge" is simply is JBCT. I can discuss any differences between this theory and that of others if you provide the relevant links.
Linda Zabzegski gave a plausible explanation as to why, if Gettier Problems show Justified True Belief to be insufficient for knowledge, then contextualism would NOT be immune from Gettier Problems. Source: https://philpapers.org/archive/ZAGTIO.pdf
There’s a trilemma regarding the relation between a belief being true on one hand, and being connected to the truth Eiither being true is:
Horn #1: SUFFICENT to be connected to the truth, in which case we’ve returned to the justified true belief theory of knowledge, or
Horn #2: UNNECESSARY to be connected to the truth, in which case a justified false belief could (at least in principle) count as knowledge, or
Horn #3: NECESSARY but INSUFFICIENT to be connected to truth, in which case it is hard to distinguish justified true belief without knowledge from unjustified true belief.
Also, some proponents of your theory of knowledge (possibly but not necessarily including you) insist that whether or not a justified true belief is connected to the truth depends on context. However, those proponents of your theory of knowledge (other than you) confused the input of the algorithm with the algorithm itself. For example, for the vast majority of those algorithms that have input, the output of the algorithm depends on the input of the algorithm. Nonetheless, if the algorithm itself is known, then any remaining cluelessness about the output of the algorithm would be reducible without residue to cluelessness about the input of algorithm. Unfortunately, those other proponents of your theory of knowledge haven’t gave any additional information about the algorithm itself. I’ll check your article to see if you do any better.
“First, a belief would be considered “justified” if it has publicly available and acceptable reasons which would warrant that belief. (J).”
Is “warrant” a distinct concept or just another word for justify? Do we have objective criteria for determining the acceptability of reasons?
“Second, that belief must actually reflect an objective state of the world. No matter how reasonable or well-informed a belief is, you wouldn’t have knowledge unless that belief were true. (T).”
This demands an impossible godlike perspective. This means I can know something that isn’t knowledge. Well, I don’t really know it, I just think I do. That seems like a problem.
Popper thought all knowledge was conjectural. That seems pretty extreme. I’m pretty sure I know 1+1=2 in a way that makes it more than a conjecture.
He also thought that justification doesn’t work. My perhaps bad summary of his argument is, the best we can do is logical deduction, and at best that always proves a hypothetical: if the premises are true and the argument is valid, the conclusion is also true. We can't know that the premises are true, without another argument. So if we have justified anything, it is the entire hypothetical, never the conclusion on its own. And since philosophers are constantly criticizing arguments in new ways, finding new twists and informal fallacies, even the hypothetical may not be fully justified.
This is not really a serious response to your post, just a knee-jerk reaction. Sorry.
Thanks for reviewing! By "warrant" I mean an explanation which would reasonably imply that belief, subject to rules of public reason (so you can explain it to others).
And knowledge does presuppose "truth," which does require a godlike perspective as you mentioned. However, the contextualist argument I provide explains why I believe we can still have knowledge in one social sense, although we couldn't in another ultimate sense. So I don't believe Popper's view, where "no" belief would be justified, is warranted.
How is “an explanation which would reasonably imply that belief, subject to rules of public reason (so you can explain it to others)” distinct from justification? Justification includes warrant, or they intersect, or they are identical? Justification is a process, warrant is just a fact?
They're not distinct, the above definition is only a type of justification. We could have private justifications (gut feelings) or process-based justifications (which wouldn't require justifications). But I argue that knowledge is correct understanding, where the knower would be able to provide an explanation for how evidence for a truth relates to that truth. Its not just having evidence, but also knowing how that evidence relates.
Children likely do, if they are capable of answering "why" to their beliefs. Babies and animals likely don't (they may not even have concepts to create beliefs).
In many cases, if we asked a child to explain one of their beliefs, they would say something like “Mom told me” or “I learned it in school.” That doesn’t seem like an explanation for how evidence for a truth relates to that truth.
UPDATE: unfortunately, you have fallen for the same confusion as the other proponents of your theory. You’re confusing the input of algorithm with the algorithm itself. The context affects the INPUT of the algorithm, without affecting the ALGORITHM itself. However, you haven’t gave much detail beyond “the output depends on the input.”. The problem is that there is cluelessness about the algorithm itself IN ADDITION to cluelessness about its inputs. The connectedness requirement looks less like an independent vindication of our epistemic intuitions about particular cases, and looks more like an attempt (successful or otherwise) to reverse engineer a general principle to accommodate our epistemic intuitions about particular cases. As a result, I would NOT be surprised if justified true belief really is sufficient for knowledge, despite of all our ( and Edmund Gettier’s) epistemic intuitions about particular cases to the contrary. As a result, I want to suspend judgment (at least temporarily) about which theory of knowledge is true.
Different fields (mathematics, history, science, english, etc.) have different standards for what qualifies as knowledge. You can create different algorithms for these various fields, but the abstract definition of "knowledge" is JBCT. Although the more facts you are able to provide, the more specific the standard can be (as is the case with language generally). Yet the core of what "knowledge" is simply is JBCT. I can discuss any differences between this theory and that of others if you provide the relevant links.
Here’s some relevant links:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/
Gettier problems don’t have the concept of a “connector” that’s why they aren’t instances of knowledge. And contextualism is just true
Linda Zabzegski gave a plausible explanation as to why, if Gettier Problems show Justified True Belief to be insufficient for knowledge, then contextualism would NOT be immune from Gettier Problems. Source: https://philpapers.org/archive/ZAGTIO.pdf
There’s a trilemma regarding the relation between a belief being true on one hand, and being connected to the truth Eiither being true is:
Horn #1: SUFFICENT to be connected to the truth, in which case we’ve returned to the justified true belief theory of knowledge, or
Horn #2: UNNECESSARY to be connected to the truth, in which case a justified false belief could (at least in principle) count as knowledge, or
Horn #3: NECESSARY but INSUFFICIENT to be connected to truth, in which case it is hard to distinguish justified true belief without knowledge from unjustified true belief.
Also, some proponents of your theory of knowledge (possibly but not necessarily including you) insist that whether or not a justified true belief is connected to the truth depends on context. However, those proponents of your theory of knowledge (other than you) confused the input of the algorithm with the algorithm itself. For example, for the vast majority of those algorithms that have input, the output of the algorithm depends on the input of the algorithm. Nonetheless, if the algorithm itself is known, then any remaining cluelessness about the output of the algorithm would be reducible without residue to cluelessness about the input of algorithm. Unfortunately, those other proponents of your theory of knowledge haven’t gave any additional information about the algorithm itself. I’ll check your article to see if you do any better.
“First, a belief would be considered “justified” if it has publicly available and acceptable reasons which would warrant that belief. (J).”
Is “warrant” a distinct concept or just another word for justify? Do we have objective criteria for determining the acceptability of reasons?
“Second, that belief must actually reflect an objective state of the world. No matter how reasonable or well-informed a belief is, you wouldn’t have knowledge unless that belief were true. (T).”
This demands an impossible godlike perspective. This means I can know something that isn’t knowledge. Well, I don’t really know it, I just think I do. That seems like a problem.
Popper thought all knowledge was conjectural. That seems pretty extreme. I’m pretty sure I know 1+1=2 in a way that makes it more than a conjecture.
He also thought that justification doesn’t work. My perhaps bad summary of his argument is, the best we can do is logical deduction, and at best that always proves a hypothetical: if the premises are true and the argument is valid, the conclusion is also true. We can't know that the premises are true, without another argument. So if we have justified anything, it is the entire hypothetical, never the conclusion on its own. And since philosophers are constantly criticizing arguments in new ways, finding new twists and informal fallacies, even the hypothetical may not be fully justified.
This is not really a serious response to your post, just a knee-jerk reaction. Sorry.
Thanks for reviewing! By "warrant" I mean an explanation which would reasonably imply that belief, subject to rules of public reason (so you can explain it to others).
And knowledge does presuppose "truth," which does require a godlike perspective as you mentioned. However, the contextualist argument I provide explains why I believe we can still have knowledge in one social sense, although we couldn't in another ultimate sense. So I don't believe Popper's view, where "no" belief would be justified, is warranted.
How is “an explanation which would reasonably imply that belief, subject to rules of public reason (so you can explain it to others)” distinct from justification? Justification includes warrant, or they intersect, or they are identical? Justification is a process, warrant is just a fact?
They're not distinct, the above definition is only a type of justification. We could have private justifications (gut feelings) or process-based justifications (which wouldn't require justifications). But I argue that knowledge is correct understanding, where the knower would be able to provide an explanation for how evidence for a truth relates to that truth. Its not just having evidence, but also knowing how that evidence relates.
So children do not know anything?
Children likely do, if they are capable of answering "why" to their beliefs. Babies and animals likely don't (they may not even have concepts to create beliefs).
In many cases, if we asked a child to explain one of their beliefs, they would say something like “Mom told me” or “I learned it in school.” That doesn’t seem like an explanation for how evidence for a truth relates to that truth.