“Concepts that express a thought that can be used pragmatically in discourse cannot be meaningless. “
This seems a bit ambiguous, since some of your examples of meaningless statements (e.g. determinism) have had advocates that probably would have claimed that they were using them pragmatically in discourse. I guess it depends on what is meant by “pragmatically “. I am sympathetic with the direction you have taken, but I don’t think you have arrived yet.
There are some Wittgenstein-flavored problems that this analysis leaves swept under the rug. Ordinary language uses words in a lazy/convenient way that sometimes combines multiple related but not identical concepts into one word in a sloppy act of abstraction or enthusiastic recognition of a family resemblance. I hope this is what is going on in much of the free will debate and some epistemology, where people seem to talk past each other, using the same words to discuss different things, a sort of interpersonal equivocation.
For instance, epistemologists always immediately exclude skill from their analysis, although we use the same word to refer to knowing how to drive and knowing the capital of France. This is good, but I doubt it is enough. My knowledge of how many toes I have is quite immediate and impervious to all but the most extreme sort of skepticism, but there are other sorts of knowledge that might turn out to be in error. Part of the problem is that we can’t seem to think of knowledge as potentially being false, but certain knowledge of the truth or falsity of many sorts of knowledge is unavailable to us, a sort of category error perhaps.
And gibberish is not always meaningless, aken poetically rather than as discourse. “‘‘Twas brillig, and the slithey toves “. wow my spell checker hates that.
What I mean by “used pragmatically in discourse” is that the concept carries a sense. Since skeptics of free will, knowledge, and morality may argue that these concepts lack sense (a physical thing can’t be free from causation, free beings can’t be inherently bound by moral restrictions) then these concepts are nonsensical. Propositions made with respect to them don’t even have a chance to be wrong since they fail to express a thought (like the liar paradox).
However the fact that we use phrases like “I know” “she chose” and “he acted wrongly” in discourse pragmatically, as they convey comprehensible thoughts, shows that these concepts “do” convey some sense. Therefore, they can’t be nonsense.
I will also discuss the Wittgenstein issue you flagged, of a term carrying multiple meanings, in the next article!
I’ve been reading up on the virtue epistemologists, who seem to at least consider reintegrating skill/ knowing how into epistemology as opposed to knowing that; and also have some subcategories of knowledge, to distinguish the sort of knowledge a small child has from the sort of knowledge an astrophysicist might have. I have some problems with them too, but I am trying to get to know enough about them to see if my reservations cash out in actual criticisms and refutations.
“Concepts that express a thought that can be used pragmatically in discourse cannot be meaningless. “
This seems a bit ambiguous, since some of your examples of meaningless statements (e.g. determinism) have had advocates that probably would have claimed that they were using them pragmatically in discourse. I guess it depends on what is meant by “pragmatically “. I am sympathetic with the direction you have taken, but I don’t think you have arrived yet.
There are some Wittgenstein-flavored problems that this analysis leaves swept under the rug. Ordinary language uses words in a lazy/convenient way that sometimes combines multiple related but not identical concepts into one word in a sloppy act of abstraction or enthusiastic recognition of a family resemblance. I hope this is what is going on in much of the free will debate and some epistemology, where people seem to talk past each other, using the same words to discuss different things, a sort of interpersonal equivocation.
For instance, epistemologists always immediately exclude skill from their analysis, although we use the same word to refer to knowing how to drive and knowing the capital of France. This is good, but I doubt it is enough. My knowledge of how many toes I have is quite immediate and impervious to all but the most extreme sort of skepticism, but there are other sorts of knowledge that might turn out to be in error. Part of the problem is that we can’t seem to think of knowledge as potentially being false, but certain knowledge of the truth or falsity of many sorts of knowledge is unavailable to us, a sort of category error perhaps.
And gibberish is not always meaningless, aken poetically rather than as discourse. “‘‘Twas brillig, and the slithey toves “. wow my spell checker hates that.
Thank you for the review!
What I mean by “used pragmatically in discourse” is that the concept carries a sense. Since skeptics of free will, knowledge, and morality may argue that these concepts lack sense (a physical thing can’t be free from causation, free beings can’t be inherently bound by moral restrictions) then these concepts are nonsensical. Propositions made with respect to them don’t even have a chance to be wrong since they fail to express a thought (like the liar paradox).
However the fact that we use phrases like “I know” “she chose” and “he acted wrongly” in discourse pragmatically, as they convey comprehensible thoughts, shows that these concepts “do” convey some sense. Therefore, they can’t be nonsense.
I will also discuss the Wittgenstein issue you flagged, of a term carrying multiple meanings, in the next article!
Looking forward to it.
I’ve been reading up on the virtue epistemologists, who seem to at least consider reintegrating skill/ knowing how into epistemology as opposed to knowing that; and also have some subcategories of knowledge, to distinguish the sort of knowledge a small child has from the sort of knowledge an astrophysicist might have. I have some problems with them too, but I am trying to get to know enough about them to see if my reservations cash out in actual criticisms and refutations.