1. You are confusing the contractual obligations of the reasonable with the contractual obligations of the unreasonable.
2. You are confusing morality with reasonableness.
3. Reasonable people would believe that reasonable choices with bad consequences are morally superior to unreasonable choices with good consequences, EVEN IF unreasonable choices with good consequences are morally superior to reasonable choices with bad consequences.
4. Reasonable people would believe that a reasonable action which is a rights violation would be morally superior to an unreasonable action which is not a rights violation, EVEN IF an unreasonable action which is not a rights violation is morally superior to a reasonable action which is a rights violation.
5. Justin Koon gave a plausible argument as to why a priori knowledge is insufficient to pre-empt Evolutionary Debunking Arguments of morality . Source:
I describe the relationship between reason and morality in the link below. If you think morality is arbitary, not connected to reason, then you will continue to be confused.
1. The point in my original comment is that a posteriori knowledge is always necessary & a priori knowledge never sufficient to pre-empt Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.
2. The defense of “just because at least 1 reasonable person would reasonably reject theory x behind the veil of ignorance doesn’t mean that theory x is false” is NOT available for your theory of normative ethics. This is because of your definition of morality.
3. It is not I, but you, who granted the reasonable rejecter’s veto.
4. It is patently absurd to think that reasonable people would, behind the veil of ignorance, converge onto the same theory of normative ethics (let alone the one true theory of normative ethics).
5. Issac Wiegman gave a plausible argument as to why our deontological intuitions are less reliable than our consequentialist intuitions Source:
1. You are confusing the contractual obligations of the reasonable with the contractual obligations of the unreasonable.
2. You are confusing morality with reasonableness.
3. Reasonable people would believe that reasonable choices with bad consequences are morally superior to unreasonable choices with good consequences, EVEN IF unreasonable choices with good consequences are morally superior to reasonable choices with bad consequences.
4. Reasonable people would believe that a reasonable action which is a rights violation would be morally superior to an unreasonable action which is not a rights violation, EVEN IF an unreasonable action which is not a rights violation is morally superior to a reasonable action which is a rights violation.
5. Justin Koon gave a plausible argument as to why a priori knowledge is insufficient to pre-empt Evolutionary Debunking Arguments of morality . Source:
https://gwern.net/doc/philosophy/epistemology/2021-koon.pdf
I describe the relationship between reason and morality in the link below. If you think morality is arbitary, not connected to reason, then you will continue to be confused.
https://neonomos.substack.com/p/what-is-morality
1. The point in my original comment is that a posteriori knowledge is always necessary & a priori knowledge never sufficient to pre-empt Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.
2. The defense of “just because at least 1 reasonable person would reasonably reject theory x behind the veil of ignorance doesn’t mean that theory x is false” is NOT available for your theory of normative ethics. This is because of your definition of morality.
3. It is not I, but you, who granted the reasonable rejecter’s veto.
4. It is patently absurd to think that reasonable people would, behind the veil of ignorance, converge onto the same theory of normative ethics (let alone the one true theory of normative ethics).
5. Issac Wiegman gave a plausible argument as to why our deontological intuitions are less reliable than our consequentialist intuitions Source:
https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FWIETEO-6.pdf%23%3A~%3Atext%3DAbstract%253A%2520I%2520argue%2520that%2520evolutionary%2520influences%2520on%2520anti-consequentialist%2Cnot%2520derived%2520from%2520the%2520consequences%2520of%2520these%2520actions.&data=05%7C02%7CNathanel.Tekalign%40southeasttech.edu%7C33bd04b63a624606705408de09d1a9df%7C98c66d8e08e64ad1ba01ca279798ce38%7C0%7C0%7C638958993393993741%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=Nto089%2FmbBUDMLKTdhQKJcpRIMrw2BwjsacxlgVxb1o%3D&reserved=0